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L Introduction
Access to legal guidance is extremely important in American society. All
persons are subject to the law-the law creates individual rights and
responsibilities affecting many aspects of social and personal life.' The law
protects and the law punishes--it is the main avenue through which justice and
freedom are secured. 2 Ignorance of the law is often no excuse-individuals are
expected to know the law and to understand their legal rights and obligations.3
Yet the law is also increasingly diverse and complex, and for many
individuals it is extremely difficult to navigate through the legal web that
surrounds their lives. 4 The lawyer or attorney traditionally has fulfilled the role
of gatekeeper and guide to the web of law. 5 Yet many low- and middle-income
Americans do not have access to an attorney because they lack adequate
amounts of disposable income.6 Consequently, various reforms have
1. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE FuTURE OF LAW: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 11 (1996) ("The law is at the heart of our personal and social
lives .... ").
2. See, e.g., CHRISTINE PARKER, JUsTLAWYERS: REGULATION AND ACCESS To JuSTICE 48
(1999) (describing how access to the law can help secure freedom and ultimately attain justice).
3. See, e.g., SUSSKIND, supra note 1, at 17 (discussing how the principle that ignorance
of the law is no excuse means that all citizens are presumed to know the law).
4. See id. at 13 ("[W]e are all subject in our social and working lives, to a body of legal
rules and principles that is so vast, diverse, and complicated that no one can understand their
full applicability and impact.").
5. See, e.g., L. RAY PATrERSON & ELLIOT E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 63
(1971) ("Law is the principal instrument of power in our society, and, since it is not self-
applying, the lawyer is the principal participant in its administration.... The lawyer is necessary
to interpret law to give it meaning for the individual, to apply law to give the individual its
benefits, and... [l]aw is thus both a restraining and an enabling instrument of society.").
6. As Justice Douglas eloquently wrote in his dissent in Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143
(1967):
Rights protected by the First Amendment include advocacy and petition for redress
of grievance and the Fourteenth Amendment ensures equal justice for the poor in
both criminal and civil actions. But to millions of Americans who are indigent and
ignorant-and often members of minority groups-these rights are meaningless.
They are helpless to assert their rights under the law without assistance. They
suffer discrimination in housing and employment, are victimized by shady
consumer sales practices, evicted from their homes at the whim of the landlord,
denied welfare payments, and endure domestic strife without hope of the legal
remedies of divorce, maintenance, or child custody decrees.
If true equal protection of the laws is to be realized, an indigent must be able to
obtain assistance when he suffers a denial of his rights. Today, this goal is only a
goal. Outside the area of criminal proceedings covered by our decisions in Gideon
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sought to provide wider access to legal assistance. For example, legal aid
programs hold the potential to address the needs of some lower income
individuals, but many other individuals are still denied access to legal
guidance.7 Therefore, many of these individuals attempt to ignore legal
problems when they arise, or they may seek to redress these problems through
the use of self-help.8 In a society where knowledge and access to the law is so
important, the legal needs of many individuals remain unmet.9
This problem is serious and requires a solution. Much of the reform
debate attempting to address inadequate access to legal guidance in past years
has focused primarily on restructuring the delivery of services in the legal
services market.l° For example, the public's legal needs traditionally have been
met by locally regulated and operating attorneys practicing alone or in small
firms.'1  Bans on multidisciplinary practice (MDP), 12 multijurisdictional
v. Wainwright and Douglas v. California, counsel is seldom available to the
indigent.
Id. at 144-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also George C. Harris & Derek F.
Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services and What We Can Learn from the
Medical Profession's Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 775 (2001)
(discussing how middle-class Americans lack access to legal services because they may be both
unable to pay lawyers fees and ineligible for public assistance).
7. See, e.g., PARKER, supra note 2, at 31-41 (describing four waves of access to justice
reform, including legal aid, which is unfortunately limited by its expense).
8. See, e.g., Christopher Curran, The American Experience with Self-Regulation in the
Medical and Legal Professions, in REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS
APPROACH TO THE REGULATION OF ATTORNEYS AND PHYSICIANS IN THE US, BELGIUM, THE
NETHERLANDS, GERMANY AND THE UK 47, 57 (Michael Faure et al. eds., 1993) ("[I]t is not
obvious that higher quality levels of services received from licensed sellers means the overall
quality level of consumer consumption will rise. Higher average quality levels will drive output
prices up and encourage consumers to substitute into lower cost services, like self-service."); see
also Julee C. Fischer, Note, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Protection or
Protection of the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L. REv. 121, 125 (2000) (discussing how self-help
products are an attractive alternative to the high costs of an attorney).
9. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 241-43 (1988)
(discussing the lack of access to legal guidance of low-income individuals and stating that "[o]n
an extremely conservative estimate, the over-sixteen poor person encounters an average of one
legal problem per year ... poor people are constantly bumping into sharp legal things"). Luban
calculates "over twenty million hours of necessary legal services that are by-and-large not
provided." Id.
10. This Note uses the term "legal services" to refer to any activity or service that
primarily or directly relates to and affects legal rights, particularly in the civil context. For
examples of the reform debates, see infra Part II, which discusses multidisciplinary practice,
multijurisdictional practice, and the unauthorized practice of law.
11. State courts have long claimed the inherent authority to regulate the practice of law
and lawyers. See, e.g., In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49, 54 (Cal. 1998) ("In
California, the power to regulate the practice of law.., has long been recognized to be among
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practice (MJP),' 3 and the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) supported this
traditional provision of services.1 4 However, society and governing law have
changed drastically since this tradition emerged. The traditional figure of the
locally operating attorney is being replaced by large firms with multistate and
multinational branches. 15  Many of the services that lawyers traditionally
provided are being encroached upon by nonlawyers and information
technology. 16 Traditional notions of MDP, MJP, and UPL likewise demand
the inherent powers of the [courts]. Indeed, every state in the United States recognizes that the
power to admit and to discipline attorneys rests in the judiciary."); In re Day, 54 N.E. 646,650-
53 (Ill. 1899) (discussing the historical regulation of the bar and confirming the judiciary's
power to regulate the practice of law); see also Quintin Johnstone, Unauthorized Practice of
Law and the Power of State Courts: Difficult Problems and Their Resolution, 39 WILLAMETrE
L. REv. 795,796 (2003) (discussing state courts' power over the unauthorized practice of law);
Joseph R. Julin, The Legal Profession: Education and Entry, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS
201, 209 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., 1980) (discussing regulation of the legal
profession and stating that "[ilt is elementary that lawyers are officers of the judicial branch of
our government. Thus in a large part, regulation is in the hands of the courts and those persons
and entities to whom the courts may have granted a role"). Scholars identify four tests that
courts developed in order to determine whether an activity constitutes the unauthorized practice
of law by a nonlawyer: the traditional practice test, the professional judgment test, the
incidental legal services test, and the public harm test or situational approach. See, e.g.,
Kathleen Eleanor Justice, There Goes the Monopoly: The California Proposal to Allow
Nonlawyers to Practice Law, 44 VAND. L. REV. 179, 187-90 (1991) (discussing the four tests
and noting the inconsistency in defining the practice of law).
12. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(2002) (prohibiting a lawyer from
forming a partnership with a nonlawyer and from sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer).
13. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-101(B) (1986) ("A lawyer
shall not practice law in ajurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of regulations of the
profession in that jurisdiction."). But see Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (allowing a
lawyer to engage in multijurisdictional practice when such conduct was authorized by
preemptive federal legislation).
14. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-101(A) (1986) ("A lawyer
shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.").
15. See, e.g., Chet Bridger, 'Blue Blood' Law Firms Dying; the Practice of Law Has
Changed Greatly Since the Days When the Good Old Boys Would Hang Around and Meet
Clients at the Buffalo Club, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 11, 2001, at B7 (reporting that "[e]conomics
101 has caught up with the law business nationally... [increased competition and other] market
forces have prompted a number of well-known local firms to disband in recent years").
16. See, e.g., ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' RESPONSIBILITY FOR CLIENT
PROTECTION, 1994 SURVEY AND RELATED MATERIALS ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF
LAw/NONLAWYER PRACTICE xvi-xvii (1996) (discussing encroachments on the bar's
jurisdiction, including efforts of paralegals and computer technology); Herbert M. Kritzer, The
Professions Are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World,
33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 713, 725 (1999) ("Much as craftspeople were displaced by early
technological developments and the division of tasks into relatively simple elements, formal
professionals are being displaced by service providers organized around highly specialized tasks
who may, when needed, draw upon modem technological tools to access information."). See
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reassessment, and much scholarly debate has concerned the need to
reconceptualize the legal services market.' 7 Underlying these debates is the
notion that the delivery of legal services necessarily involves the regulation of
the practice of law.' 8 The notion is that the practice of law-the delivery of
certain legal services-requires state regulation to protect the public from
incompetent providers. Yet there is no clear consensus on what is meant by the
"practice of law."' 9 Some reformers recognize the need for a definition of
generally SUSSKIND, supra note 1 (discussing the future of law as including effective use of
information technology).
17. See, e.g., Robert R. Keatinge, Multidimensional Practice in a World of Invincible
Ignorance: MDP, MJP, and Ancillary Business After Enron, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 717,717 (2002)
(discussing changes in the legal services market). Keatinge states that:
As lawyers' services and the manner in which those services are provided expand
and change, the rules governing lawyers and legal services must respond. The
forces behind the change include clients' increasing disregard for state and national
boundaries; the growth in the types of services being provided by lawyers, often to
include services that either historically have been provided by others or which are
entirely new; and the encroachment on the work of legal professionals by
nonlawyers and interactive software.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CLIENT PROTECTION, supra note 16, at xix-xx ("The ebb and flow of UPL regulation by the
American bar, therefore, has been affected primarily by external forces. These include court
decisions, the cost of litigation, the consumer movement, increased demands to satisfy unmet
legal needs, technology, and other factors beyond the bar's control.").
18. See infra note 23 (discussing how regulation of the legal services market involves
regulation of the legal profession).
19. Definitions of the practice of law vary greatly from state to state, and even scholars
lack a consensus on what activities the practice of law encompasses, although many argue that it
does not include routine services, as will be discussed in Part H.A. L.c and Part III. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 34-3-6 (2003) (defining the practice of law as including anyone who appears
before court, gives legal advice, or acts in a legal representative capacity for consideration and
making exceptions for several nonlawyer providers); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. SCR 3.020 (2003)
("The practice of law is any service rendered involving legal knowledge or legal advice, whether
of representation, counsel or advocacy in or out of court, rendered in respect to the rights,
duties, obligations, liabilities, or business relations of one requiring the services."); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 484.0 10 (West 2004) (defining the practice of law as "the appearance as an advocate in
a representative capacity or the drawing of papers... or the performance of any act in such
capacity in connection with proceedings pending or prospective before any court of record...
or any body ... constituted by law or having authority to settle controversies"); R.I. GEN. LAwS
§ 11-27-2 (2003) (defining the practice of law as "the doing of any act for another person
usually done by attorneys at law in the course of their profession" and listing several activities
included within the definition including representation before a court, giving legal advice, and
drafting legal instruments); Dressel v. Ameribank, 664 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Mich. 2003) ("[A]
person engages in the practice of law when he counsels or assists another in matters that require
the use of legal discretion and profound legal knowledge."). For a recent comprehensive list of
state definitions, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF
THE PRACTICE OF LAW, REPORT, app. A (2003) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT], available at
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the practice of law. Attempts to formulate a definition, however, largely have
been met by failure.20 This Note contends that the legal community should
formulate a model definition of the practice of law to address the many issues
arising from restructuring the legal services market. Ultimately, a model
definition is needed to help remedy problems with access to law and justice in
modem American society. When the practice of law has been defined
adequately, it will be easier to develop and determine better and more efficient
ways of providing legal services to the public. Furthermore, lawyers, by taking
the initiative and defining the practice of law, can improve the image of the
legal profession in the eyes of the public. E' This Note posits that the definition
of the practice of law, although often shrugged off as unnecessary or
unachievable, actually plays a vital role in the legal services market.
Furthermore, if the legal profession is unwilling to formulate a definition, the
profession may find itself stripped of much of its current authority over the
legal services market. This Note also contends that the prior approach taken in
defining the practice of law is inefficient and is contributing to the difficulty of
formulating a model definition. Therefore, this Note presents an alternative
approach for defining what constitutes the practice of law.
Part I of this Note addresses the need for a definition of the practice of
law and examines the debate over UPL in order to demonstrate how the
definition of the practice of law can affect the legal services market. Part Ill
discusses the need for the legal community to formulate a model definition and
examines a recent effort by the American Bar Association towards this end.
Part IV discusses a conceptual approach frequently taken in defining the
practice of law and instead proposes an alternative method and perspective.
II. The Need for a Definition of the Practice of Law
The practice of law has often been approached through an "I know it when
I see it" attitude; courts and critics frequently express the sentiment that the
practice of law is impossible to define.22 There is, however, a definite need
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/model def statutes.pdf.
20. See infra Part III.A (discussing the appointment, activities, and recommendations of
the Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law).
21. See infra Part III.D (discussing how a clear definition of the practice of law can
improve the image of the profession in the eyes of the public).
22. See, e.g., Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Mangan, 763 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Me. 2001)
(discussing the difficulty of formulating a definition of the practice of law to fit all situations
and stating that "[t]he determination of what constitutes the practice of law is very fact
specific"); Keatinge, supra note 17, at 762 (discussing a fact-specific alternative for the
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for a clear definition of the practice of law. The primary importance of the
definition is that it interacts with prohibitions against the unauthorized practice
of law to establish what activities or legal services the state will regulate.23 In
other words, the definitions of the practice of law and the unauthorized practice
of law determine who can provide what legal services to the public.24
definition of the practice of law). Keatinge states:
In a world in which professional services are changing, this may be the only truly
workable approach. Under this approach, separate rules may apply to such
activities as providing representation to the indigent, acting as in-house counsel,
practicing as an out-of-state attorney, acting as a third-party neutral, acting pursuant
to another professional license, and performing legislative lobbying.
Id. Linda Galler, however, presents a different view:
To date, the practice of law has been defined only in rudimentary fashion by vague
statutes and court rules as well as haphazard court decisions. While an "I know it
when I see it" approach might have served Justice Stewart's needs in defining
pornography, an analogous strategy in defining law practice in the context of MDPs
would reduce, or perhaps even negate, the effectiveness or value of any regulatory
scheme adopted by the states.
Linda Galler, "Practice of Law" in the New Millennium: New Roles, New Rules, But No
Definitions, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 1001, 1001-02 (1999) (citations omitted).
23. See Keatinge, supra note 17, at 722 (describing the penalties for the unauthorized
practice of law). Keatinge states that "[t]he principal application of the definition of the practice
of law occurs in the enforcement of rules and statutes proscribing the unauthorized practice of
law. In general, most states have statutes or rules that prohibit the 'practice of law' by persons
not licensed to practice law." Id. at 753. For example, by restricting the practice of law to
lawyers, nonlawyers are restricted from performing those activities considered to constitute the
practice of law. By regulating lawyers, the state also is regulating "the practice of law" by
restricting specified activities to certain service providers and then regulating those providers.
This function of the definition is seen in many judicial opinions concerning the unauthorized
practice of law. For a sampling of these opinions and further examination of the relationship
between "the practice of law" and the "unauthorized practice of law," see infra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text.
24. The practice of law can determine the what in this sentence, whereas the
"unauthorized practice of law" determines the who. See infra note 26 and accompanying text
(discussing the interplay between the unauthorized practice of law and the practice of law). Of
course, the distinction between the two may not be so clear-cut. A statement in a recent Seventh
Circuit opinion illustrates and supports this distinction:
The issue of whether Appellants engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
requires us to examine, as a preliminary matter, what constitutes the practice of law.
In Illinois, the practice of law includes, at a minimum, representation provided in
court proceedings along with any services rendered incident thereto, even if
rendered out of court. More generally, providing any advice or other service
"requiring the use of any legal skill or knowledge.... the legal effect of which,
under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined," amounts to
practicing law. Only under the direct supervision of a licensed attorney may certain
of these functions be performed by a paralegal. Absent the imprimatur of
meaningful attorney supervision, any legal advice or other legal service provided by
a nonlawyer constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
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Thus, the definition of the practice of law has an almost symbiotic
relationship with the unauthorized practice of law. In order to understand the
relationship between the practice of law and the unauthorized practice of law, it
is useful to conceptualize the practice of law as encompassing a particular
sphere of legal services or activities. Every service falling inside the sphere is
considered the practice of law; any activity falling outside of the sphere is not
considered the practice of law. 25 When someone not authorized to practice law
provides services falling within that sphere, that person is liable for the
unauthorized practice of law. Likewise, a person cannot be liable for the
unauthorized practice of law when performing a service falling outside of the
sphere because he or she has not "practiced" law by performing that activity.
The two concepts of the practice of law and the unauthorized practice of
law are so interrelated that the fine distinction between them can be easily
misunderstood. However, the two concepts are in fact different. The definition
of the practice of law involves what activities are considered to be within the
sphere, whereas the concept of unauthorized practice has to do with who
may perform the services falling within that sphere.26 Thus, the practice
United States v. Johnson, 327 F.3d 554, 561 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); see also
Johnstone, supra note 11, at 806 (discussing the unauthorized practice of law and stating that
"[t]he underlying purpose of this field of law is regulating who may provide legal services and
under what circumstances"). The relationship between the two concepts will be further explored
in this Part of the Note.
25. The following is a useful visual conception of the description of the sphere of
regulated activities found in the accompanying text above:
All Other Activity and SerUces or Unregulated Activity
26. This distinction is implicit in many statutes and court opinions, although it is rarely
explicitly pointed out. See, e.g., In re Skobinsky, 167 B.R. 45, 57 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) ("An
unauthorized practice of law violation occurs whenever a person engages in activity restricted to
the purview of a licensed practitioner of law. Therefore, unless appellant is a duly licensed
attorney, his experience is irrelevant to this appeal."). Discussing an activity as constituting the
unauthorized practice of law blurs this fine distinction. Whether or not an activity will
constitute the unauthorized practice of law will always depend upon who is performing that
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of law operates to determine which legal services will be regulated by the state,
and the prohibition against unauthorized practice of law determines who may
perform those regulated services. This sphere may encompass a broad or
narrow swath of activities, resulting in either many or few regulated services. If
the definition of the practice of law covers a broad amount of activity, then
exceptions will probably be carved into the sphere, which will shield particular
service providers from liability for providing certain legal services.27
The definitions of the practice of law and the unauthorized practice of law
can have a profound effect on how legal services are provided to the public. By
working with the ban on unauthorized practice to determine who can provide
what services, the definition of the practice of law directly influences
competition in the legal services market, which in turn has great influence upon
the price of legal services. 28 The price of those services then directly affects
who is able to afford legal services, and consequently controls access to legal
guidance.29
activity-the activity cannot constitute unauthorized practice when an authorized person is
performs it. Black's Law Dictionary also demonstrates this distinction by defining the practice
of law:
The professional work of a duly licensed lawyer, encompassing a broad range of
services such as conducting cases in court, preparing papers necessary to bring
about various transactions from conveying land to effecting corporate mergers,
preparing legal opinions on various points of law, drafting wills and other estate-
planning documents, and advising clients on countless types of legal questions.
The term also includes activities that comparatively few lawyers engage in but that
require legal expertise, such as drafting legislation and court rules.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1191-92 (7th ed. 1999). Black's defines the unauthorized practice
of law as "[t]he practice of law by a person, typically a nonlawyer, who has not been licensed or
admitted to practice law in a given jurisdiction." Id. at 1192.
27. If a broad, largely unqualified definition of the practice of law is controlling in a
jurisdiction, then certain service providers, such as title insurers or real estate brokers, may be
permitted to perform services that technically fall within the definition. The exemption for that
service provider may be found in a variety of places, such as statutes or case law definitions of
either the practice of law or the unauthorized practice of law, or may be found in statutes or case
law related to that particular service or provider. For example, Louisiana's definition of the
practice of law includes certifying or giving opinion to title, but an exception in the statute
provides that "[nlothing in this Section prohibits any person from... preparing abstracts of
title; or from insuring titles to property... but every title insurance contract relating to
immovable property must be based upon the certification or opinion of a licensed Louisiana
attorney authorized to engage in the practice of law." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37: 212(A)(2)(d),
(B) (West 2003).
28. See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the
American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services
in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 83,93 (2000) (discussing the anticompetitive
effect of unauthorized practice of law prohibitions which may result in higher fees).
29. The unauthorized practice of law is part of a licensing regime that shields local
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In order to fully understand the relationship between the definition of the
practice of law and the legal services market, it is useful to understand some of
the reasoning behind recent debates regarding reform of the legal services
market. The following sections present a summary of the debates behind MDP,
MJP, and UPL in order to illustrate how these reforms can influence access to
justice and to demonstrate how the definition of the practice of law relates to
those debates. Incidentally, the unauthorized practice of law is often
understood to refer to what legal services a nonlawyer may or may not legally
offer to the public. Unauthorized practice rules, however, refer not only to
what services a nonlawyer may provide, but also to what services a lawyer may
provide to the public in any given jurisdiction.3 ° MJP encompasses the
lawyers from competition with alternative providers, both nonlawyers and nonlocal lawyers.
See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Future of the Legal Profession: Delivery of Legal Services to
Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 544-45 (1994) (discussing the regulatory
licensing regime of the legal profession, including bans on the unauthorized practice of law).
Part H.A will explore the definition of the practice of law and its relationship with this licensing
regime and the legal services market, although this Note presents a simplified version of the
effects that the licensing of services has on society. Christopher Curran identifies five general
categories of the social costs of occupational licensing. Curran, supra note 8, at 73. Two of
these categories are price distortions and service availability distortions in the professional
services market. Id. Curran states:
[S]ucessful occupational licensing alters the range of services available to
consumers. The stated objective of all occupational licensing is to remove low
quality services from the market. In reality, regulators can only remove some of the
low quality services from the market. Higher prices due to occupational licensing
will cause consumers to increase the amount of self-provision of services or to
delay the purchase of service. Because purchasers of lower quality services have
withdrawn from the market, the average level of services received by consumers
purchasing services will rise. However, the average quality of services received by
all members of society may not rise .... Since the quality of services is a normal
good, it is reasonable to conclude the poor bear a greater proportion of these costs
than do the wealthy. Such inequities in developed economies are troublesome.
Curran, supra note 8, at 77.
30. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, CLIENT
REPRESENTATION IN THE 21 ST CENTURY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICIONAL
PRACnCE 8 (2002) [hereinafter ABA MJP REPORT] (discussing the relationship between
unauthorized practice of law rules and multijurisdictional practice), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/final-mjp-rpt 121702.pdf. The report states:
States give effect to jurisdictional restrictions through UPL statutes and
proscriptions in the rules of professional conduct such as those based on ABA
Model Rule 5.5. Although UPL provisions are most often applied to nonlawyers,
they have also been applied to lawyers. They subject lawyers to the risk of sanction
(in some states, criminal sanction) for practicing law within a state where they
are not licensed. Besides being enforced directly, these provisions may be
invoked in disciplinary proceedings based on disciplinary rules that prohibit
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latter application of unauthorized practice, and this Note will refer to the
former application by the designation UPL.
A. The Definition of the Practice of Law and Its Role in the Restructuring
of the Legal Services Market
In recent years, the debates over MDP, MJP, and UPL all dealt with the
restructuring of the legal services market, and each debate involved a
reconceptualization and consideration of what it means to practice law. 31 For
example, MDPs are entities in which lawyers and nonlawyers partner together
to provide comprehensive legal and nonlegal services to their clients. 32 Client
wants and needs often encompass both legal and nonlegal issues, and MDPs
have the ability to offer services at lower prices because of lower transactional
costs. 33 However, there are serious objections to the use of MDPs, such as the
fear of losing lawyers' independent professional judgment.34 The definition of
lawyers from engaging in, or assisting others in, the unauthorized practice of law,
in fee forfeiture actions or other civil actions by clients against their lawyers or by
opposing parties in the context of disqualification motions.
Id.; see also Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLA.
L. REv. 977, 1028 (2003) ("Initially, it is worth noting that statutes and state ethics rules
regarding unauthorized practice.., regulate two different forms of conduct.... they prohibit
non-lawyers from engaging in law practice.... [and they also] regulate what lawyers can do in
a particular state when they are not licensed to practice in that jurisdiction .... ").
31. See, e.g., Keatinge, supra note 17, at 758 ("The concepts of MDP, MJP, and ancillary
business all depend upon the definition of the practice of law and the concept of the
unauthorized practice of law.").
32. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, RECOMMENDATIONS,
REPORT, AND REPORTER'S NOTES ON THE ABA COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE,
app. A (June 8, 1999) (defining the term MDP as "a partnership, professional corporation, or
other association or entity that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of
its purposes the delivery of legal services to a client"), available at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mdpappendixa.html.
33. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 28, at 118-23 (discussing the benefits
achieved through the use of a MDP). Dzienkowski & Peroni describe these benefits:
[A] client with legal and non-legal problems does not need to schedule
appointments with several service providers who may or may not have worked
together before. Eliminated transaction costs may include duplication of effort, the
need for the professionals to consult each other in costly conferences or meetings,
and the need for each provider to bill a sufficient dollar amount to ensure that the
transaction is viable from a business and liability perspective.
Id. at 118-19.
34. See id. at 137 ("The opponents of MDPs argue that lawyers' participation in
multidisciplinary practice raises serious concerns about each of the core ethical values of the
legal profession."); John D. Messina, Lawyer + Layman: A Recipe for Disaster! Why the Ban
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the practice of law is related to the MDP debate in many respects. For
example, to the extent that nonlawyers may provide legal services in a MDP,
they may engage in the unauthorized practice of law. 35 The resolution of this
issue brings up the question of exactly what activities fall within the definition
of the practice of law.36
The definition of the practice of law is also important to the debate behind
multijurisdictional practice, or MJP. The individual states have traditionally
regulated lawyers, but the importance of state boundaries lessen as the ebb and
flow of interstate transactions increases. 37 MJP may lower the price of legal
services by diminishing the need to retain local counsel when legal issues cross
jurisdictional lines. 38  On the other hand, the states have an interest in
regulating the practice of law in their individual jurisdictions to ensure
competence in the legal services market-an outside lawyer may not be familiar
enough with local rules and procedures to give competent advice, and
incompetent providers could harm unwary clients. 39 The debate over MJP
ultimately led to the new revision of Model Rule 5.5, which if adopted by the
states, allows multijurisdictional practice on a "reasonably related" and
"temporary" basis.4° Lawyers alternatively have the option of being admitted
on MDP ShouldRemain, 62 U. Prrr.L REv. 367,378--82 (2000) (discussing ethical problems presented
by MDPs, including the loss of lawyers' professional independence). Perlman, supra note 30, at 1038
(discussing views opposing and favoring MDPs and stating that "[one might argue that lawyers would
necessarily lose professional independence if they partnered with non-lawyrs because non-lawyers would
control the legal work that MDP lawyers perform").
35. See, e.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 28, at 111-12 (discussing the possibility of
liability for the unauthorized practice of law for nonlawyers providing legal services in the context of tax
practice).
36. See generally Johnstone, supra note 11, at 801 (discussing multidisciplinary practice and how it
relates to the unauthorized practice of law debate and also noting the cunent status of the MDP debate).
The current status of the debate over MDP is reflected in Model Rule 5.4. See MODEL RuLES OFPROF'L
CONDUcr R. 5.4 (2002) (prohibiting a lawyer from forning a partnership with a nonlawyer and from
sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer). See generally Keatinge, supra note 17 (evaluating MDPs in light of
the recent Enron scandal).
37. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional
UnauthorizedPractice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEx. L REv. 665,666-69 (1995) (discussing the
transformation of the legal profession, especially the increasingly interstate nature of the practice of law).
38. See, e.g., ABA MJP REPORT, supra note 30, at 12 (discussing the costs of a regulatory regime
that does not accommodate multijurisdictional practice, including creating unnecessary expense by
engaging local counsel).
39. See, e.g., Perlnan, supra note 30, at 1034 (discussing the debate behind multijurisdictional
practice, including one view stating that a "Massachusetts lawyer is less likely to be familiar with the
relevant law in Rhode Island than a Rhode Island lawyer, so strict MJP provisions are necessary as a
matter of consumer protection").
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2002); see also Perlman, supra note 30, at
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pro hac vice,41 but this procedure does not cover transactional practice.42 Many
of the transactions that lawyers provide in other jurisdictions may fall within
the sphere of the practice of law, and to the extent that those services fall
outside of the Model Rule or pro hac vice exceptions, that lawyer engages in
the unauthorized practice of law.43 A definition of the practice of law could
clarify what services a nonlocal attorney could provide in ajurisdiction without
liability for unauthorized practice. 44
1033 (stating that the recently approved revision would make it easier for lawyers to practice
multijurisdictionally if the rule is adopted by the states); David W. Raack, The Ethics 2000
Commission's Proposed Revision of the Model Rules: Substantive Change or Just a
Makeover?, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 233,258-60 (2001) (discussing the Ethics 2000 revision of
Model Rule 5.5).
41. Black's Law Dictionary defines pro hac vice as "[f]or this occasion or particular
purpose. The phrase usu[ally] refers to a lawyer who has not been admitted to practice in a
particular jurisdiction but who is admitted there temporarily for the purpose of conducting a
particular case." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1227 (7th ed. 1999).
42. See, e.g., ABA MJP REPORT, supra note 30, at 8 ("For example, every jurisdiction
permits pro hac vice admission of out-of-state lawyers appearing before a tribunal, although the
processes and standards for pro hac vice admission differ. For transactional and counseling
practices, and other work outside court or agency proceedings, there is no counterpart to pro
hac vice admission."); see also La Tanya James & Siyeon Lee, Article, Adapting the
Unauthorized Practice of Law Provisions to Modem Legal Practice, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS
1135, 1137-39 (2001) (discussing the potential for unauthorized practice of law liability for
MJP, which arises primarily in transactional practice "because lawyers who litigate may be able
to be admitted in that state without examination through pro hac vice admission. However,
states have no procedure for admitting an out-of-state lawyer when the legal services being
provided do not involve a courtroom appearance.").
43. As the ABA Committee on Multijurisdictional Practice notes in its report and
recommendations:
The explosion of technology and the increasing complexity of legal practice have
resulted in the need for lawyers to cross state borders to afford clients competent
representation.
In connection with litigation, it is not uncommon for parties to retain lawyers in
whom they have particular confidence, or with whom they have a prior relationship,
to represent them in lawsuits in jurisdictions in which the lawyers are not licensed,
and for these lawyers to be admitted pro hac vice to appear on behalf of the client.
However, lawyers also perform work outside their home states for which they
cannot obtain pro hac vice admission, which is not available prior to the filing of a
lawsuit or to authorize work that is not related to a judicial proceeding in the
particular state. For example, litigators commonly go to states other than those in
which they are authorized to practice law in order to review documents, interview
witnesses, enter into negotiations, and conduct other activities that are either
ancillary to a lawsuit pending in a state in which they are authorized to practice or
that are performed before a lawsuit is filed.
ABA MJP REPORT, supra note 30, at 10.
44. See, e.g., Diane Leigh Babb, Take Caution When Representing Clients Across State
Lines: The Services Provided May Constitute the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 50 ALA. L.
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1. The Debate Behind UPL
The debate behind UPL provides the most conceptually direct application
of the definition of the practice of law: The definition of the practice of law
directly affects what services nonlawyers may offer to the public. Therefore,
the definition has a direct effect on access to legal services. Rules banning the
unauthorized practice of law shield lawyers from competition with nonlawyers
in the delivery of all legal services considered to constitute the practice of law.45
The resulting "legal monopoly" allows for uncompetitive prices, and as the
costs of legal services rise, less affluent individuals are pushed out of the
market.46 Practitioners justify this legal monopoly by arguing that it protects
REv. 535, 537 (1999) (examining varying definitions of the practice of law and stating that
"[t]hese broad definitions of the practice of law make it nearly impossible for an out-of-state
attorney to represent his or her client without the threat of sanctions"). Babb contends, "[tihe
application of these definitions in determining whether an attorney has engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law should be modified in order to conform with the role of interstate
transactions in modem society." Id.
45. See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 246-47 ("By restricting the practice of law to members of
the bar, of course, a professional monopoly is guaranteed and a higher-than-otherwise level of
lawyers' fees is maintained."); Justice, supra note 11, at 180 ("The legal profession consistently
has fought outside competition and successfully has controlled competition to ensure
professional survival.... state statutes and bar association regulations forbid the practice of law
by nonlawyers .... These limitations, however, may be resulting in denial of access to the legal
system to the indigent public.").
46. See, e.g., Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An
Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2581 (1999)
(discussing the legal monopoly). Denckla states:
The nexus between required bar admission and the states' proscription of UPL has
created a "lawyer monopoly" over a great deal of activity outside of the courts,
which are the traditional domain of lawyering.
As a result, UPL restrictions often prohibit nonlawyers from either giving out-of-
court legal advice or helping prepare legal documents, except where no
accompanying advice is given. This type of prohibition overwhelmingly affects
people of limited means, who are unable to retain a lawyer based on an inability to
pay fees or, in the case of a pro bono lawyer, based on limited availability of free
legal help.
Id. Professor Rhode points out that the legal monopoly is somewhat of a misnomer: "In
technical terms, the profession does not enjoy a monopoly in providing legal services; its
conduct in restricting entry and negotiating agreements with competing groups is that of a trade
association or cartel, rather than that of a monopolist." Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the
Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice
Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1,4 n.7 (1981). Sherman Act challenges to the legal monopoly
usually have been rejected under either the state action doctrine or the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. See, e.g., Lender's Serv., Inc. v. Dayton Bar Ass'n, 758 F. Supp 429, 445-65 (S.D.
Ohio 1991) (discussing state action and Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity and rejecting an
antitrust challenge to an unauthorized practice of law action by finding that the bar association
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the public from incompetent providers.47 Critics attack the legal monopoly as
protecting lawyers' self-interest and maintaining lawyers' incomes.48
The following three sections present a brief discussion of three differing
views on the possible scope of the definition of the practice of law. A broad
definition enlarges the sphere of regulated activities to encompass most, if not
all, of the legal services market. 49 A narrow definition narrows the sphere so
that the practice of law is restricted and encompasses only some legal
services. 50  The case for the repeal of UPL presents a situation where the
definition of the practice of law is no longer of any special relevance-there is
no difference between services found within the sphere and those found outside
it because any willing provider can provide legal services. 51 Although this Note
ultimately determines that a narrow definition would best serve the public's
interest, the other two views also have merit and raise some issues that should
be considered when formulating a definition. The following sections attempt to
present the merits of each competing view.
a. The Argument for a Broad Definition
The argument that rules defining the practice of law should be broad in
scope has its basis in the need to protect the public. 2 This need to regulate
is entitled to immunity). See generally Stephen Rubin, The Legal Web of Professional
Regulation, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 29,33-43 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds.,
1980) (discussing the history of the "public calling" and how it relates to regulation of the
professions and discussing the Parker state action doctrine).
47. See infra Part II.A. l.a (discussing the arguments underlying a broad definition of the
practice of law, one that upholds much of the legal monopoly); see also infra note 52 and
accompanying text (discussing how a broad definition of the practice of law is based upon the
need to protect the public).
48. See infra Part II.A.l.b (discussing the arguments for the repeal of unauthorized
practice of law statutes, which some believe uphold the legal monopoly and are not ultimately in
the public interest).
49. See infra Part U.A. L.a (discussing the argument for a broad definition of the practice
of law).
50. See infra Part II.A.l.c (discussing the argument for a narrow definition of the practice
of law).
51. See infra Part H.A. 1.b (discussing the argument for the repeal of UPL).
52. See, e.g., Denckla, supra note 46, at 2593-94 (discussing how the Model Code's
Ethical Considerations reflected the justification for prohibiting UPL). Denckla believes the
Model Code reflects four justifying reasons for prohibiting UPL:
[TIhese ECs reflect the dominant justifications for prohibiting UPL and restricting
the practice of law to members of the bar: (1) protecting the public against harmful
incompetence and unscrupulous conduct; (2) protecting the administration of
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and restrict much of the legal services market is caused by imperfections found
in that market.53 Two imperfections in particular characterize the rationale for
the restriction of the legal services market.
The first imperfection is found in the heterogeneity of service
providers.54 The arguments to ban nonlawyer providers from the marketplace
are based on the belief that nonlawyers provide legal services of inferior
quality and thus entail a greater risk of harm to consumers. Nonlawyers,
lacking formal training in the law, will be unable to deal with or to recognize
legal complexities when they arise, and clients' legal interests will be harmed
by their incompetence.55 The resulting harm from incompetent services is so
severe that it should be avoided.56 Essentially, because nonlawyers are
justice from incompetent or unscrupulous nonlawyers; (3) supplying a system of
discipline to regulate lawyers; and (4) rewarding lawyers with an economic
advantage over their potential and actual competitors in exchange for their
submitting to regulation.
Id. at 2594.
53. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 29, at 544-46 (discussing how the licensing of legal
service providers has been justified through economic arguments based on imperfections in the
market for legal services, including information asymmetry). This Note does not attempt a full
economic analysis of the legal services market, but only seeks to present the essence of the
varying arguments for regulation or deregulation. For further examination of the market for
legal services, see generally REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin
eds., 1980) and REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH TO THE
REGULATION OF AT'TORNEYS AND PHYSICIANS IN THE US, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS,
GERMANY AND THE UK (Michael Faure et al., eds., 1993).
54. Ira Horowitz points out several imperfections found in the market for professional
services, including the heterogeneity of professional skills. He notes:
Professionals offer skills that require specialized knowledge and considerable
formal training and that, especially in the perceptions of the persons hiring the
skills, generally benefit from experience. A professional's talents are not directly
transferable to other professions, nor do practicing professionals comprise a
homogeneous group. Thus, prospective purchasers are confronted by differentiated
professional services. This differentiation, whether real or imagined, may be the
intended result of the individual professional's specific acts or may stem from
inherent quality differences affected by the nonhomogeneity of the professionals'
skills, training, and experience.
Ira Horowitz, The Economic Foundations of Self-Regulation in the Professions, in REGULATING
TE PROFESSIONS 3, 5-6 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., 1980). Because of the nature of
professional services, nonlawyers, who lack the training and experience in the law that lawyers
possess, are thought to offer inferior quality services.
55. See, e.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 28, at 92 ("The stated purpose of the
unauthorized-practice-of-law rules is to protect the public. The theory is that a non-lawyer
delivering legal services will make errors in legal work that a lawyer would not make, and will
thereby harm the consumer of the legal services.").
56. See, e.g., J. Howard Beales, Ill, The Economics of Regulating the Professions, in
REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 125, 127 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., 1980)
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assumed to offer inferior services, a client will be more likely to be harmed
when he or she receives legal services from a nonlawyer. This potential for
harm should be avoided through regulation.
On the other hand, the inferior quality of nonlawyer services alone would
not justify a complete ban on nonlawyer practice. If nonlawyers consistently
gave inferior services, and clients were consistently harmed, then market forces
would weed nonlawyer providers out of the market. Clients would not seek out
inferior and damaging services for their legal needs, and nonlawyers would be
unable to survive in the marketplace.5 7 However, another imperfection in the
market for legal services prevents consumers from avoiding these risks and thus
strengthens the argument for regulation.
A second imperfection found in the legal services market is one of
information asymmetry-legal services consumers are unable to evaluate the
quality of the services that they are seeking or that they have received. 58 In any
market there may be a difference between the amount of information that either
the seller or the buyer possesses. 59 For example, when a potential orange buyer
enters the market for fruit, he or she will usually know less about the quality of
the oranges than the purveyor of the fruit knows, such as the conditions
under which the fruit was grown or the best types of growth conditions.
In the legal services market, however, the assumption is that the
asymmetry of information between a competent provider (a lawyer) and a
(discussing market imperfections and stating that because the harm from low quality services
can be quite high, there may need to be regulatory protection from low quality services).
57. See, e.g., Benjamin Hoom Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic
Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARiz. ST. L.J. 429, 436
(2001) ("[A] free-market system relies upon a combination of consumer expertise to choose the
best and safest products, and ex post damages actions to control for substandard or dangerous
products. When these options fail, ex ante regulation may be justified."). Barton is discussing
justifications for barring substandard lawyers from the marketplace, but his analysis can easily
be transferred to the justification of barring nonlawyers, viewed as inferior to lawyers, from the
marketplace.
58. See id. at 437-38 (discussing how regulation is necessary to protect the public from
inferior service when consumers lack adequate information to evaluate the quality of the
service). Barton states that "the most common defense of lawyer regulation-protection of the
public from incompetents-depends upon two separate claims: information asymmetry ... and
[that] incompetent lawyers could cause substantial harm." Id.
59. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainly in
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing information asymmetry and
contending that a market for lemons results from uncertainty of quality); Hayne E. Leland,
Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. POL. EON.
1328 (1979) (discussing information asymmetry market imperfections).
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potential consumer (a client) is so great that many consumers will be unable
to evaluate the quality of services that they are seeking or even receive.
60
The provision of legal services usually involves the application of
specialized knowledge to a particular set of facts,61 and the legal services
consumer is seeking services precisely because he or she lacks the required
information to make a decision about his or her legal rights.62  This
unsophisticated potential legal services consumer may be unable to evaluate his
or her legal needs and to assess when he or she requires the assistance of an
63attorney. The asymmetry of information may be so great, in fact, that in some
cases a client will be unable to evaluate the quality of the service that he or she
receives. For example, the quality of legal service may not bear a strong
relationship to the ultimate result-even the highest quality legal defense may
still result in a loss.64 Because legal services are believed to be particularly
sophisticated and complex, many clients will not be able to evaluate the quality
of the services they need or receive and therefore will be unable to avoid
harmful providers.
65
60. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Preservation of Quality Sanctions
Within the Professions, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 185, 186 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen
Rubin eds., 1980) ("The quality of professional services is generally difficult to evaluate on an
ex ante basis and is often hard to gauge ex post."); Horowitz, supra note 54, at 7 ("Imperfect
information is inherent in professional services which, by nature of being highly specialized and
requiring considerable training, cannot be appropriately evaluated by most purchasers.").
61. See infra note 154 (discussing the practice of law as a professional service, including
the application of specialized knowledge to particularized facts).
62. See Beales, supra note 56, at 125 ("A consumer consults an agent precisely because
he does not have sufficient information to make a decision on his own.").
63. See id. (discussing information asymmetry in the professional service market). Beales
states:
It is therefore difficult for the consumer to evaluate fully the professional's
advice-if he knows enough for competent evaluation, he is likely to find the
advice unnecessary. The consumer can check the advice for consistency with other
information in his possession, but it is the essence of the transaction that the
consumer cannot fully evaluate the information.
Id. at 125-26.
64. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 54, at 8 ("The best legal defense can result in the
conviction of an innocent person, and the worst legal defense can result in the release of one
who is guilty.").
65. See, e.g., Julin, supra note 11, at 204 (discussing information asymmetry in the legal
services market). Julin states:
The consumer has little, if any, way of measuring the quality of his or her attorney.
Indeed, I suggest that this evaluation process may be even more difficult than in the
field of medicine ... [as] something tends to happen which the patient is able not
only to observe but also to feel. [In the legal services context] the client commonly
is in no position to render a considered judgment as to what has taken place in
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These two imperfections underlie the justification for regulating and
licensing many markets, including the market for legal services. 66 If these
imperfections are found in the market for any good or service, then it might be
in the public interest to assure a minimum level of quality through regulation in
order to prevent consumer harm.67 Regulation must do for the consumer what
the consumer is unable to do for himself-evaluate quality and avoid harm.
Regulation of the legal services market may take many forms, but two
forms in particular are certification and licensing. 68  Certification seeks to
designate providers who possess certain qualifications. Under a certification
regime qualified practitioners are "flagged" so that consumers may recognize
that the practitioner can provide at least a minimum quality of service, but
*noncertified providers are not barred from offering their services in the
marketplace. 69 Therefore, certification gives consumers the choice between
paying for certified or noncertified services. Consumers are also given some
guidance in the assessment of quality. Under a licensing regime, only licensed
providers are permitted to offer services in the marketplace.70 Bars against
qualitative terms.
Id.; see also Stephen Rubin, The Legal Web of Professional Regulation, in REGULATING THE
PROFESSIONS 29, 38 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., 1980) ("Consumer inability to
evaluate the quality of professional services and the hazard to both consumers and the public
generally of an erroneous selection are reasons given to justify the prohibition of practice by
anyone who has not undergone the scrutiny and approval of licensure.").
66. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 57, at 437-48 ("[E]x ante regulation is necessary to
protect the public from a substandard product or service ... when consumers lack sufficient
information to gauge the quality of a product, and when the product or service presents a
substantial danger to the health or safety of consumers.").
67. Cf. Horowitz, supra note 54, at 12 (discussing how professional self-regulation seeks
to control the imperfection of heterogeneity of providers by assuring a minimum level of
competence). Horowitz states: "[P]rofessional licensing requirements are designed to ensure
not that all practitioners are equally able, only that all possess at least some minimal level of
competence." Id.
68. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Compass of Competition for Professional Services,
in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 107, 112-13 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., 1980)
(discussing a spectrum of regulation including certification and licensing).
69. See Curran, supra note 8, at 54 (discussing certification and stating that "[u]nder such
a program the state allows the member of an occupation to use a title if he meet[s] certain
standards.... Anyone can work in the occupation without the certification; however, only those
meeting the state standards can use the official title."); Elzinga, supra note 68, at 113 ("A
feature of certification, but not licensing, is that it can be consistent with free competition and
carry the potential for remedying market failure resulting from consumer ignorance.").
70. See Curran, supra note 8, at 53-54 (discussing licensing). Curran states that "[u]nder
licensing, admittance to a profession is a right granted by the state. No one may enter the
occupation without meeting minimum admittance standards or continue in the occupation
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unauthorized practice forbid an unlicensed person from offering his or her
services in the marketplace. By forbidding any unlicensed individual from
providing services, licensing restricts competition in favor of licensed
individuals.7'
There is a correlation between the severity of market imperfections and the
extent of regulation required: The more extreme the potential for consumer
harm and the more extreme the gap between buyer and seller information, the
stronger the case for a stringent regulatory scheme.72 The argument for a broad
definition of the practice of law contends that the imperfections in the legal
services market are so extreme that it would be in the best interests of legal
services consumers and the public that all practitioners be licensed.73 Under a
broad definition of the practice of law, only lawyers will be able to provide
most, if not all, legal services.
The use of an attorney assures a minimum level of competence. An
attorney almost always has three years of legal education and training at an
accredited law school, has passed a bar examination, and often has met
continuing legal education requirements.74 The training and testing of attorneys
assure consumers of intellectually competent services.75 Consumers also are
assured ethically competent services. Bar applicants are often subject to
character and fitness requirements, and attorneys are bound by rules of
professional conduct providing for various duties of loyalty to the client.76
With a nonlawyer provider there are no such competency assurances, and
because legal service consumers will often be unable to evaluate quality,
nonlawyer providers will have the opportunity to cut comers or perpetrate
fraud.77 Even if a nonlawyer attempts to provide high quality services,
without remaining in good standing with the regulatory board." Id. at 53.
71. See, e.g., Elzinga, supra note 68, at 114 ("[T]he licensing of professionals, by its
nature, is inconsistent with a free-market allocative system.").
72. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 57, at 441 (discussing the need for regulation of lawyers
as conceived of on a sliding scale).
73. See id. at 437-38 (discussing how the claim to regulation depends upon both of the
market imperfections being high).
74. See id. at 449 ("More than two-thirds of the state bar associations have turned to
mandatory continuing legal education ... in an effort to guarantee ongoing competence.");
Cramton, supra note 29, at 547 (discussing measures designed to ensure that clients receive
competent legal services as including bar admission and continuing legal education).
75. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) ("A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
76. See generally MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2002) (providing for duties of
diligence, confidentiality, and avoiding of conflicts of interest).
77. See, e.g., In re Mid-America Living Trust Assocs., 927 S.W.2d 855, 860 (Mo. 1996)
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nonlawyers often will be unable to deal effectively with the intricacies of the
law. For example, nonlawyers do not have the extensive legal background that
lawyers have, and they often offer a very specialized, narrow service to the
market.78 Therefore, nonlawyers may not be able to recognize potential legal
issues and will not have enough legal savvy to refer the consumer to a
competent provider in order to deal with those issues.
In essence, this theory argues that the cost society pays by restricting
competition through licensing is worth the assurance of quality that licensing
brings. 79 Rules of unauthorized practice of law are part of the bargain that
society struck by providing lawyers a monopoly in return for the assurance of
high quality services.80 These rules "help to protect the public from charlatans,
incompetents, and over-eager, first-year law students."8'
Beyond the public protection basis for restricting the delivery of legal
services to licensed attorneys, there is also a public perception argument that
may justify a broad definition. This argument is based on the paradigm of
professionalism-the belief that the practice of law is a profession and not a
(pointing to three types of consumer harm stemming from nonlawyer legal service providers);
Hon. A. Jay Cristol, The Nonlawyer Provider of Bankruptcy Legal Services: Angel or Vulture?,
2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 353,357 (1994) (describing nonlawyer "vulture" service providers
who "sell their services to the financially distressed, and often cause harm to the debtor").
78. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 11, at 799 (stating that although lawyers have some
competition from nonlawyers, "[olne difference between lawyers and nonlawyers as legal
services providers is that, collectively, lawyers as a profession provide all kinds of legal services
and in all fields of law, whereas each of the nonlawyer professions and occupations, except
paralegals, most always operate in more limited legal service spheres").
79. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 54, at 14-15 (discussing market imperfections and
how regulation seeks to assure qualified services at the cost of denying service to the poor).
Horowitz contends, "[tihe value judgment issue is whether this supposed misallocation [of
resources] is worth suffering in order to prevent the low-priced, presumably least qualified
persons from practicing the profession. In the main, our society has judged it to be so, and the
policies of self-regulation must be evaluated in this light." Id. at 15.
80. See, e.g., Julin, supra note 11, at 201 (discussing restrictions on competition through
licensing). Julin argues that licensing "is the societal cost worth paying to make certain
competency of counsel is a reality capable of being achieved and not simply an illusory
objective." Id.; cf. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6-7
(1988) (discussing lawyer's freedom from outside regulation). Gordon states:
These freedoms are usually analyzed as part of a social bargain: they are public
privileges awarded in exchange for public benefits. Lawyers are given a monopoly
over certain kinds of work.... They enjoy the social prestige of professional status.
In return, supposedly, the bar regulates its members to ensure that lawyers will not
only represent clients competently and faithfully but also uphold the law.
Id.
81. Susan Poser, Multijurisdictional Practice for a Multijurisdictional Profession, 81
NEB. L. REv. 1379, 1385 (2003).
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mere business.82 Viewing the provision of legal services as a profession, a
public calling of which the primary purpose is to benefit and protect society,
rather than as a mere business that places personal gain at the forefront, makes
law practice seem like an honorable undertaking. Subjecting the legal services
market to capitalist forces breeds mistrust in the law and in lawyers. 83 When
the public views the provision of legal services as honorable, this in turn breeds
respect for the law, which then promotes social order.8 Requiring a minimum
level of competence in the legal services market promotes respect for the law,
as "incompetent legal aids tends to reduce public confidence in the political
system and might increase political unrest. " 85 In order to promote respect for
the law and general societal good, the definition of the practice of law should
be broad enough in scope to restrict most of the legal services market to
lawyers.
b. The Argument for a Free Market
Although promoting public safety and protecting social order are noble
undertakings, these arguments are not seen as very realistic. The argument
for the repeal of unauthorized practice of law rules undercuts the assumptions
supporting the argument for a broad definition and instead places all its
reliance on the operation of the free market. One does not have to look very
hard to see that many Americans dislike and distrust lawyers.86 Lawyers are
82. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and the Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1229, 1231 (1995) (describing the "Professionalism Paradigm" in the beliefs and
perceptions of the bar that is characterized by an altruistic higher commitment to social good
and rejection of selfish business practices). Pearce describes the professional paradigm as
entailing a bargain with society for a monopoly in return for the profession using its skills for
the good of the public. Id. at 1239. Pearce states, "[w]hile esoteric knowledge made the
bargain necessary, lawyers' altruism made the bargain acceptable. In contrast to
businesspersons, who maximized financial self-interest, altruistic lawyers placed the interests of
the common good and their clients above their own financial and other self-interests." Id.
83. See id. at 1243-44 (discussing professional paradigm taboos against business-like
conduct, including maximizing "profits by serving clients to the detriment of the profession's
public trust").
84. Cf PARKER, supra note 2, at 20 (discussing how consumers' satisfaction with the legal
services they receive from lawyers affects how those consumers view the law). Parker states,
"[blad service from lawyers is not just another consumer issue, it makes people feel they have
been denied justice." Id.
85. Curran, supra note 8, at 50-51.
86. See, e.g., Mike France, Close the Lawyer Loophole; Their Ability to Reduce Legal
Liability for Executives is Fueling White-Collar Crime, Bus. WK., Feb. 2, 2004, at 70
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viewed as playing an unnecessary role in many routine legal matters.8 7 Clearly
the attempts to restrict the legal services market and the insistence that the law
is a profession have failed to promote respect for lawyers or the legal system.
88
Lawyers are instead seen as manipulating unauthorized practice of law rules to
ensure their own economic gain under the guise of public protection. 9
There may be many factors contributing to the decline of lawyers in public
perception. However, this decline is connected with the failure of the
professional paradigm itself. The professional paradigmenvisions the lawyer
as protector of society, as champion of the poor.9° By allowing lawyers to
dominate the legal services market, society entered into a bargain with the legal
profession-in exchange for its monopoly, the profession should provide the
public with high quality service that is both intellectually and ethically
competent. 91
Many critics argue that lawyers have not been holding up their side of the
bargain. Consumers are no longer ensured intellectually competent services
through the use of an attorney. Numerous problems with American legal
education cast doubt on the ability of law schools to adequately train law
(expressing skepticism about the ethics of business lawyers). France observes "[m]any of the
most highly paid corporate attorneys in America all but ignore the spirit of tax, corporate, and
securities laws. Instead, they are often linguistic Houdinis who specialize in hypertechnical
arguments as to why their client's rat poison meets the five-part test for being apple pie." Id.
87. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 3-4 (2000) ("About three-fifths of Americans describe attorneys as greedy, and
between half and three-quarters believe that they charge excessive fees. There is even broader
agreement that lawyers handle many matters that could be resolved as well and with less
expense by nonlawyers.").
88. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 57, at 453-54 (discussing how the elevated social status
created by unauthorized practice rules has not ensured professionalism in lawyers). Barton
states, "[tlhe wave of dissatisfaction over lawyers' lack of professionalism, in fact, suggests that
current lawyers are not serving these purposes, regardless of any regulation." Id. at 453.
89. See, e.g., Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 28, at 92-93 ("[T]he unauthorized-
practice-of-law rules give lawyers a monopoly over the way in which the need for legal services
is satisfied in this country. It is a profession's attempt to limit competition and preserve the
power of lawyers over the delivery of legal services."); Marie Haug, The Sociological Approach
to Self-Regulation, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 61, 67 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin
eds., 1980) ("Licensing arrangements, in short, can be characterized less as methods for
protecting the public and for providing external social control in the interest of the consumer
than a means of protecting the occupation's market dominance.").
90. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the "Professional Paradigm" as
set out by Russell Pearce).
91. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the social bargain that
secures lawyers a monopoly in return for the assurance of intellectually and ethically competent
services).
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students for day-to-day practice. Bar examinations often serve merely as a
screening device, as "[i]n most states, passage requires only minimal writing
capacity, knowledge of basic legal principles, and an ability to function under
extreme time pressure. 9 3  Some scholars suggest that continuing legal
education does not and cannot assure competence. 94 Regulatory requirements
for legal education are out of tune with the legal environment and can no longer
ensure intellectual competence.
Critics also suggest that consumers are no longer ensured ethically
competent services by an attorney. For example, professional irresponsibility
is often seen as going unpunished, as regulatory bodies lack either the
resources or the incentive to punish violations. 95 Advocacy and justice are
skewed because only well-financed interests are well represented.96 More
lawyers are treating their profession as a business, seeking to maximize
profits, and catering their services only to those who can afford it.97 The
legal monopoly allows lawyers to set uncompetitive prices, and as a result,
consumers are forced to seek assistance from an attorney or, more frequently,
receive no legal assistance at all.98 In short, the Professional Paradigm has
92. See RHODE, supra note 87, at 185-92 (discussing many problems with legal education
and the need for reform).
93. Id. at 150; see also Barton, supra note 57, at 445 (discussing problems with the bar
examination as not assuring competency and stating that "[a]side from the costs associated with
the bar's lofty barriers to entry, their efficacy is open to doubt").
94. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 87, at 156 (discussing various ways that lawyers can
fulfill their continuing legal education requirements and suggesting that there is no assurance
that educational goals can be met with the use of continuing legal education requirements);
Barton, supra note 57, at 449-50 (stating that continuing legal education "hardly guarantee[s]
any level of competence" and discussing several problems with continuing legal education
including that it is "not designed to identify or correct incompetence, instead it is meant to
reinforce the skills and knowledge of competent attorneys").
95. See, e.g., France, supra note 86, at 79 ("Self-regulation is weak, with state bar
associations more interested in preventing non-lawyers from selling cheap wills in strip malls
than in disciplining blue-chip law firms that participate in multibillion-dollar frauds.").
96. See, e.g., PARKER, supra note 2, at 20-22 (discussing public views that the legal
profession only gives good quality representation to the rich and discussing trends in the United
States that show lawyers for the rich increasingly are being controlled by their clients).
97. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 82, at 1265 ("Defenders and opponents of the
Professionalism Paradigm agree that lawyers are behaving like businesspersons. They structure
their practices and sell their services using the same techniques as other businesspersons. Many,
if not most, commentators recognize that financial self-interest plays an important role in
lawyers' conduct.").
98. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 57, at 441-42 (discussing the societal costs of minimum
standard requirements). Barton states:
Barriers to entry and minimum standards impose substantial costs on society at
large. First, the cost of legal services to consumers is inflated. Barriers to entry,
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failed.99 The general public is no longer receiving quality legal services and
access to justice. The law has become a business, and as such it should be
regulated like a business and subject to free market forces.
Many scholars believe that the two concerns underlying the argument for a
broad definition could be adequately addressed under a free market. In
response to quality concerns, critics point out that attempts to mandate a
minimum level of service ignore those consumers who would be willing to face
higher risks in return for lower costs.' ° Furthermore, by driving up prices and
forcing many consumers to seek self-help, licensing may actually reduce the
overall quality of service received by the public.' 0 '
Many critics also believe that a general background in law achieved
through bar admittance is not necessarily an assurance of high quality service.
Studies and experience strongly suggest that consumers are not at a
significantly greater risk of harm when they receive their legal services from a
lay provider rather than an attorney.102 Subjecting all legal service providers to
minimum intellectual and ethical competence requirements, such as malpractice
liability, may minimize any risk posed by nonlawyer services.
0 3
As to information asymmetry problems, the quality of legal services
should be no more difficult to evaluate than any other market evaluation, and
such as the bar requirements, naturally result in fewer practitioners. Fewer
practitioners means a reduced supply of legal services, which increases the cost of
hiring a lawyer. The amount of extra expense is determined by the availability of
substitute goods; if a consumer can substitute another, non-regulated product for
legal services, regardless of barriers to entry, price inflation will be dampened.
Prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law, however, explicitly ban any
substitute goods.
Id.
99. See generally Pearce, supra note 82 (discussing the failure of the professional
paradigm and arguing for a new business paradigm based more on market forces).
100. See Beales, supra note 56, at 133 (discussing the hidden costs of excluding lower
quality services from the market place such as eliminating the market for low-quality services).
101. See Curran, supra note 8, at 57 ("[I]t is not obvious that higher quality levels of
services received from licensed sellers means the overall quality level of consumer consumption
will rise. Higher average quality levels will drive output prices up and encourage consumers to
substitute into lower cost services, like self-service.").
102. See generally Joyce Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay Conveyancers-
Empirical Evidence Says "Cease Fire!", 31 CoNN. L. REV. 423 (1999) (analyzing the average
incidence of harm between attorney and lay provision of legal services in real estate closings
and finding that the risk of harm posed by lay provision of legal services was not significant
enough to justify its exclusion from the marketplace).
103. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 46, at 94 ("[L]aymen providing legal assistance could be
held to the same standards of competence and ethical conduct as attorneys for purposes of civil
liability.").
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gaps in information are steadily decreasing.' 4 The argument for a free market
proposes that any information asymmetry concerns could instead be addressed
through certification.' 0 5 Consumers would be able to recognize a superior
service provider through a regime of certification, and providers would have an
incentive to comply with certification requirements in order to gain a
competitive advantage in the marketplace. 1°6 At the same time, uncertified
providers also would be able to participate in the marketplace, and consumers
who are willing to chance the risks of low quality service would have an avenue
for legal assistance. 0 7 The free market model thus presents an attractive
alternative to the expansive and expensive broad definition.
104. See, e.g., Beales, supra note 56, at 126 (comparing consumer evaluation of
professional services to evaluation of an automobile). Beales notes that in both cases the costs
of inaccurate assessment can be high. In particular, he finds that in the professional services
market "the consumer can observe whether the treatment solved the problem which provoked
his initial visit to a professional. Indeed, the ability to recognize that a problem exists
presupposes a considerable amount of consumer knowledge." Id. at 128; see also Elzinga,
supra note 68, at 109 ("Consumers may have little savvy, and the stakes may be high, in
selecting a lawyer. But this may also be true in selecting a furnace. In addition, the market
mechanism itself may generate information to assist otherwise unwary buyers in the
consumption of complex professional services."); Haug, supra note 89, at 75 (discussing the
demystification of professional knowledge). Haug states, "[t]he knowledge gap between
professional and client is being narrowed as more and more consumers are equipped to absorb
the information on health and legal matters which is disseminated by the media. Do-it-you-
yourself books... are popular examples. " Id.; see Pearce, supra note 82, at 1267 (comparing
legal services to other goods in terms of consumers' ability to evaluate their quality).
105. See, e.g., George C. Leef, Lawyer Fees Too High? The Case for Repealing
Unauthorized Practice of Law Statutes, in REGULATION, at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regu
lation/reg20nlc.html (1997) (arguing for the repeal of unauthorized practice of law statutes and
the imposition a regulatory regime of certification) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
106. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 57, at 447 ("[U]nder certification the availability of a
substitute, that is, uncertified practitioners, acts as a natural drag on any over-pricing by the
certified. There would also be free entry into the market for the uncertified, providing a further
downward pressure on prices.").
107. See, e.g., Elzinga, supra note 68, at 117 (discussing the benefits of certification).
Elzinga states:
There is nothing immutable about a world in which, say, those who practice law
must be graduates of an approved law school and successful takers of a bar
examination. If these standards were in fact efficient.., professionals with these
credentials could, individually or collectively, apprise clients of these advantages
through certification. But clients would still be free to hire other individuals
(presumably at lower prices if the credentials were in fact quality-related) to meet
some of their needs for legal counsel. The entrance of previously unqualified
professionals would lower the overall price of the service, but it is not intuitively
clear that quality would suffer in all cases.
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c. The Argument for a Narrow Definition
The argument for a narrow definition of the practice of law recognizes and
addresses some of the weaknesses and strengths of both the argument for a
broad definition and the argument for the repeal of the unauthorized practice of
law. Under a narrow definition of the practice of law, service providers would
only be deemed to be practicing law when providing select legal services. The
definition would be narrowed substantially to allow for nonlawyer provision in
many services traditionally considered to be the exclusive province of licensed
attorneys, but certain services would still be regulated and restrained.
A narrow definition recognizes that the underlying premises of the
argument for a broad definition have some merit and are generally true in the
provision of some, but not all, legal services. A narrow definition also
recognizes that, although the free market model can address some of these
public protection concerns, the market may not always provide the best
framework for regulating the practice of law. For example, the potential risk of
harm created by incompetent service in some legal services, such as criminal
defense, is so severe that it becomes necessary to provide an assurance of
competence.10 8 Furthermore, although the increasing complexity of law calls
for increased specialization, a general background is often essential to
competent service because many legal problems do not fit easily into discrete
categories-a legal provider needs to be able to recognize extrinsic issues when
they arise. L°9 Although the benefits of increased competition in the marketplace
are certainly worthwhile, some sort of limiting device is needed to address these
potential consumer harms.
The free market model suggests that an alternative regulatory regime is
certification, in which competence is used primarily as a marketing device.1 10
Certified providers would have to comply with minimum quality requirements
in order to retain their certification, but all other providers would not have to
comply. Minimum levels of competence in noncertified providers would have
to be assured through other types of regulation. Therefore, the free market
108. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 57, at 440 (noting that, although the harm from many
legal transactions is remediable, "some potential harms, notably those involved in criminal
defense work, are potentially irremediable and may justify regulation").
109. See SUSSKIND, supra note 1, at 17 ("However, no area of the law-no matter how
specialized, obscure or arcane-is completely self-contained and there are dangers in this
compartmentalization, especially those of disregarding potentially applicable, neighboring areas
of law.").
110. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing several arguments for
imposing a regime of certification on the legal services market instead of licensing).
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model also suggests that subjecting all legal providers to intellectual and ethical
competence qualifications, and providing a consumer remedy for violation of
those qualifications, might curtail potential harmful behavior."' However, the
process of subjecting all providers to minimum entry requirements does not
significantly differ from the licensing regime already in place, and the costs of
compliance with these requirements would be reflected in the price of
services.t 12 Malpractice liability, if taken seriously, also drives up prices and, at
the very least, lowers the minimum quality assured in the marketplace." 13 It
appears that the only way the free market model truly will reflect market prices
is if minimum competence requirements and potential liability for noncertified
providers are largely discarded. 14 In other words, the only way the free market
model will work is if society stops trying to minimize risk.
One problem with leaving the market unregulated and allowing
consumers to evaluate quality levels on their own is that information
asymmetry does exist in some situations. Legal services are information and
111. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (articulating a suggestion that all legal
service providers should be held to minimum standards of competence).
112. Cf. Cramton, supra note 29, at 550 (discussing the rising costs of entry into the legal
profession and the effect of entry costs upon ultimate prices).
113. For example, a malpractice remedy for incompetently rendered services may not
adequately assure competence standards in the market for legal services as well as licensing.
This, again, is due in part to information asymmetry:
[Blecause many individuals are "one-shot" participants in the legal market, they are
much more likely to suffer from the three major information asymmetries that foster
agency problems .... Not only do many individual clients lack the sophistication,
knowledge or means to monitor or prevent agency problems, they also have less
power when such problems are identified, in part because they are often one-shot
participants who cannot necessarily promise future business. Individual clients, of
course, can seek to use other controls-principally liability controls-that address
lawyer misconduct.... Although certainly a potential remedy for the type of
agency problems from which individuals commonly suffer, malpractice actions are
subject to limitations as a control device. Some individual clients do not realize
when they are the victims of malpractice. Most important, malpractice suits are not
effective where the misconduct at issue does not result in provable damages that
outweigh the transaction costs involved in the malpractice litigation. Professional
discipline, then, would seem to be better than liability controls as a means of
addressing individuals' "low-level agency problems."
Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor
Schneyer's Proposal, 16 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 1, 49-50 (2002).
114. Cf. Jeffery W. Stempel, Embracing Descent. The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm
for Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Profession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 25, 59 (1999)
(noting that free market advocates rarely argue for pure market approach and stating that "there
is an inherent inconsistency in advocating a business/market solution to the problems of legal
services and then refusing to embrace a pure market approach").
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advocacy services--consumers would not seek legal assistance if they could
adequately navigate through the law by themselves." 5 The asymmetry of
information between consumer and provider in the legal services market
sometimes can be quite high. For example, many legal services consumers do
not use legal services frequently--they are one-time consumers, and therefore,
might not have prior experience with which to compare the present service. 
1 6
The free market model suggests that the use of market information devices
might address information asymmetry problems." 7 But even if educational
efforts are successful at increasing understanding of the legal services market,
these efforts cannot solve all information asymmetry problems because no
marketing device can change the unpredictable nature of legal services."
8
Many consumers may not have the savvy to avoid an incompetent provider and
may be unwittingly exposed to high risks.
Allowing legal services consumers to be exposed to high risks does not fit
well within a society that idealizes equal justice for all." 9 In the end, neither
115. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (discussing information asymmetry and
how it is exacerbated by the nature of legal services).
116. See RHODE, supra note 87, at 144 (discussing the rationale for the regulation of legal
services). Rhode states that "[m]ost individual ... clients are one-shot purchasers. They
seldom consult an attorney, and their lack of experience, coupled with the difficulties and
expense of comparative shopping, makes it hard to assess the quality of assistance." Id.
117. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing certification as a possible way
to remedy information asymmetry problems in the legal services market).
118. See supra Part I.A. l.a (discussing how the quality of legal services infrequently bears
a relationship to the eventual result, making it difficult for consumers to evaluate quality);
Horowitz, supra note 54, at 12 ("The professionals' clients, too, are not homogeneous and have
differing abilities to evaluate and process information about professional services.... Under
uncertainty, perfect information is not necessarily worth its cost, nor will additional information
necessarily improve decisions if one is incapable of appropriately evaluating and processing the
information."). But see Barton, supra note 57, at 485-86 (discussing how information
asymmetry in the legal market could be addressed by providing more information).
119. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 9, at 240 (contending that equal access to the law must
be understood as equal access to equal legal services, not as access to minimally competent legal
help). Luban states, "[lI]aw, unlike many other professions, is adversarial in character, so in
practice, minimal access may turn out to be no better than no access." Id. Butsee Barton, supra
note 57, at 480 (criticizing Luban's argument as not necessarily requiring regulation of the legal
market).
The free market model argument-that legal services are no different than complex durable
goods--often seems to forget the importance of access to justice in the first place-namely, the
importance of law in individual and social life. See supra Part I (discussing the importance of
law in American society). The free market model's response is typically to point to the harm
caused by a wrong choice in the automobile market (such as, an accident resulting in serious
physical injury or death) to demonstrate the similar importance of that market. See, e.g.,
Elzinga, supra note 68, at 128 (comparing the market for professional services to the market for
complex durable goods and stating that "both incompetent physicians and low
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the broad definition model nor the free market model appears to be in tune with
the concept of equal justice. Under a broad definition, prices are driven up so
high that many consumers can no longer afford access to justice. Under a free
market model, there is no assurance of quality, and legal interests may be
harmed. A narrow definition of the practice of law seeks to walk a middle path
between these two models and the problems they present. 1
20
Under a narrow definition, many of the benefits of a free market model
would be realized. Competition for many legal services would be increased,
leading to lower prices and increased access for the public.' 21 For example,
many critics suggest that the definition of the practice of law could encompass
complex or novel issues and leave routine services outside the definition of the
practice of law.122 Nonlawyers would be allowed to provide so-called routine
legal services, whereas licensing still would be required for complex
quality automobiles can kill"). Of course, the government tries to avoid such harm by
regulating automobiles, such as setting standards for child restraints. 49 C.F.R. § 571.225
(2004); see also Stempel, supra note 114, at 48-49 (1999) (arguing that harms from
incompetent legal services are unique). Stempel states:
[T]here are several unique hazards and difficulties posed by poor lawyering. First,
consumers of legal services are particularly vulnerable to harm if services provided
are incompetent or self-serving, since representation frequently deals with matters
extremely important to the client. Second, improper or incompetent lawyering is
difficult to detect in a timely fashion. Third, legal activity has potentially long-
lasting and wide-ranging effects on society, requiring that its regulatory paradigm
curb self-dealing by lawyers as much as possible.
Id. The harm from incompetently rendered legal services should likewise be avoided through
regulation, such as requiring minimum qualifications for activities entailing risk of severe harm.
A major problem with defining the practice of law is determining which harms should be
avoided.
120. Cf. Julin, supra note 11, at 205 (discussing the need for access to the legal system and
the need for maintenance of quality). Julin finds that "[t]he objective of the reform sought is at
least two fold. First, it is to make legal services available at a lower cost to a greater numbers of
persons in a form which will expedite the result sought, whether it be counsel or litigation.
Second, the objective is to improve the overall quality of legal services available." Id.
121. See, e.g., Kritzer, supra note 16, at 743-45 (discussing different ways that opening up
the legal services market to nonlawyers will promote access to justice). Kritzer notes:
In those areas of legal services where lawyers have obtained control, access to
services depends on a combination of fee structures, client resources, and
availability of legal aid. Opening previously controlled legal services for delivery
by those who do not possess the full credentials of a legal professional has the
potential of greatly widening access to legal services.
Id. at 743.
122. See Julin, supra note 11, at 204-05 (discussing the possibility that quality control
could be divided between routine and unique services). Julin states, "Could it be that the whole
quality control process need not be brought to bear on what is simple and routine as opposed to
that which is complex and unique?" Id. at 205.
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services. 12 3 By allowing nonlawyers to provide some legal services to the
public, greater access to legal guidance could be achieved.
A narrow definition of the practice of law, opening up competition in
much of the legal market while leaving a role for the traditional attorney, also
could improve the public perception of lawyers and increase respect for the
law. 124 For instance, the increased access to legal services and increased
knowledge of the law that will result as the services become more affordable to
a larger segment of the public could promote a feeling of participation in the
legal process.125 The legal monopoly would be confined to a smaller portion of
the legal services market. However, lawyers still would have exclusive power
over a portion of the legal services market and therefore still would enjoy status
as a profession. The conception of lawyers as a profession also encourages
lawyers to act in a professional, public-minding way.126  Furthermore,
incompetently rendered legal services have a wider detrimental effect on
society in general. Therefore, it might not always be wise to allow consumers
to choose incompetent services.'
27
Many benefits could be achieved by defiming the practice of law to include
only a limited amount of legal services. As will be discussed, the services that
eventually fall within the definition ideally would be those that entail a
greater risk of harm. 128 Thus the regulatory regime would still involve
123. Consider, however, that this Note does not necessarily endorse a routine/complex
distinction of the practice of law. See Part IV (suggesting an alternative perspective for
formulating the definition of the practice of law).
124. Cf. John C. Buchanan, The Demise of Legal Professionalism: Accepting
Responsibility and Implementing Change, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 563, 573 (1994) (discussing the
connection between image of the legal profession and legitimacy of government). Buchanan
notes:
As the symptoms of the legal profession's failures continue to appear, the public
becomes less and less confident in its ability to carry out its governmental role.
This loss of confidence in a vital branch of government-one third of the cherished
American tripartite--erodes the very foundation upon which our government
depends.
Id.
125. LUBAN, supra note 9, at 248-66 (discussing the right of the poor to have legal services
and describing how cutting people out of the legal system undercuts its legitimacy).
126. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 114, at 46-47 ("Lawyers should continue to be
regulated as professionals... not because of the traditional bases for professional self-
regulation such as the complexity rationale, but because the professionalism paradigm does a
better job of fostering judgment with regard for public as well as private interests among
lawyers than does the business paradigm.").
127. See id. at 49 (arguing that there are long-lasting and far-reaching societal implications
from incompetently rendered legal services).
128. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 57, at 439-41 (suggesting that not all legal services
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licensing, but the scope of restricted activities would be substantially narrowed
to subject the legal services market to increased competition. 129 The difficulty
in formulating a narrow definition, however, is distinguishing those activities
that should be restricted from those that should not. Producing the ideal
definition of the practice of law therefore entails a fine balancing between
affordability and assurance of quality.
B. The Practice of Law Is Worth Defining
The reasoning underlying the MDP, MJP, and the UPL debates illustrates
the importance of the definition of the practice of law. 130 The definition can
alter how legal services are offered in the market, which in turn profoundly
affects who can afford access to the legal services market. In other words, the
definition of the practice of law affects the price of the legal services and access
to justice.
For example, imagine that Wanda and William Woodhouse, a young
middle-class couple living in Forest State, have a disabled child, Timothy, who
attends Forest State Elementary. 13 Forest Educational Services Corporation
(FESC) is a nonprofit organization that provides advice, counseling, and
advocacy services to families of children with disabilities. Martin Mahogany is
a nonlawyer employee of FESC who possesses specialized knowledge and
training in the field of special education. The Woodhouses utilize FESC's
counseling services frequently.
present a risk of severe, irreversible harm and that regulation of the legal profession should be
confined to services presenting that risk); infra Part IV (arguing that the activities falling within
the practice of law should be "high-risk" services).
129. A system of certification also may be useful in the unlicensed portion of the legal
services market, as a scheme of certification does provide a device for many consumers to
evaluate quality. See Beales, supra note 56, at 133 (discussing the two approaches to
professional regulation as task-specific licensing or certification and the benefits of certification
as a remedy to information asymmetry problems).
130. See, e.g., Keatinge, supra note 17, at 758 (discussing the role of the definition of the
practice of law in legal service reform debates).
131. The facts of this hypothetical are drawn to a large extent from In re Arons, 756 A.2d
867 (Del. 2000). In that case, the Parent Information Center of New Jersey represented families
with disabled children in due process hearings. Id. at 868-69. The Delaware Supreme Court
determined that the representation constituted the practice of law and that the Individuals with
Disabilities Act did not provide an exception for their activities under the Delaware prohibition
against the unauthorized practice of law. Id. at 872-73. The Center violated the prohibition
against the unauthorized practice of law. Id. at 874. See generally Debra Baker, Is This Woman
a Threat to Lawyers?, A.B.A. J., June 1999, at 54.
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The Forest State Educational Board decided to make some changes to
Timothy's placement at Forest State Elementary, and the Woodhouses are
unhappy with those changes. They are entitled to challenge the placement
under the Forest State Children with Disabilities Education Act, which provides
for several procedural safeguards, including the opportunity for an impartial
due process hearing in front of the Forest Department of Education. The
Woodhouses, suffering great financial burdens and seeking affordable
representation, approach Mahogany and ask him to represent them during the
hearing. Would Mahogany and FESC be liable for UPL if he represents the
Woodhouses? What are the Woodhouses' legal service alternatives if
Mahogany is unable to represent them because of prohibitions against UPL?
The answers to these questions largely depend upon Forest State's definition of
the practice of law.
For instance, assume Forest State determines that it is in the public interest
to have a broad definition of the practice of law. Prior case law includes
representation before an administrative tribunal within that definition.
Mahogany will be subject to liability under Forest State's unauthorized practice
of law statute unless there is an explicit exemption for nonlawyer representation
at a due process hearing before the Forest Department of Education generally,
or for FESC-like providers particularly. Because Forest State's practice of law
definition and the Act as interpreted provide for no exception, Mahogany is
unable to represent the Woodhouses. The Woodhouses, unable to afford the
high cost of an attorney and ineligible for public legal assistance, will most
likely be forced to proceed without legal guidance.
If, on the other hand, Forest State decides to repeal its unauthorized
practice of law statute, then Mahogany will be able to represent the
Woodhouses without fear of liability. Assume the worst-case scenario occurs,
however, and the due process hearing results in an adverse decision. When the
Woodhouses decide to appeal that decision to Forest State Court, Mahogany,
unfamiliar with court procedure and unwilling to disclose his incompetence,
neglects to file a necessary pleading. The Woodhouses' claims are denied. If
Forest State decides to impose intellectual and ethical competency requirements
on all legal service providers, FESC's prices will have to reflect the costs of its
compliance with those minimum standards. As a result the Woodhouses may
not be able to afford Mahogany's services in the first place, even though the
services are set at competitive prices.
Assume now that Forest State, wanting to introduce more competition
into the legal services market, decides that the risks associated with a free
market are not in the best interests of the public. Instead, Forest State adopts a
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narrow approach to its definition of the practice of law. Forest State
determines that representation before an administrative tribunal does not fall
within the definition of the practice of law but has determined that
representation before the Forest State court falls within the definition. Thus,
Mahogany can undertake the representation of the Woodhouses without fear of
UPL liability. However, when it becomes apparent that the Woodhouses want
to appeal their adverse decision to Forest State court, Mahogany has a strong
incentive to refer the matter-Mahogany may be liable if he persists in
representing the Woodhouses in state court. Increased competition in the legal
services marketplace may lower the prices that many Forest State attorneys
charge, and so the Woodhouses may be able to afford an attorney's assistance.
Even if the Woodhouses are not able to retain competent counsel, they will, at
the very least, have whatever little guidance Mahogany is able to give them.
In reviewing these scenarios, it is apparent that the operation of the
definition of the practice of law is very important in terms of access to legal
guidance. Defining the practice of law may be a very difficult task, but the
difficulty of the task in no way detracts from the need for it to be done.1 32 The
task is not impossible, and as discussed below, a comprehensive definition of
the practice of law is possible if approached from a perspective that avoids
thinking about the issue in the abstract. 133 Of course, there may be a question
as to whether defining the practice of law is important enough to justify the
effort in formulating a definition. This Note, however, argues that the
definition of the practice of law is of sufficient value because of the profound
effect it can have on the delivery of legal services. Access to legal guidance
and, ultimately, access to justice are worthwhile endeavors. 134 The practice of
law, therefore, should be defined.
132. John Gibeaut, Another Try: ABA Task Force Takes a Shot at Defining the Practice
of Law, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2002, at 18. ("Like the Quest for the Holy Grail, the pursuit of an ideal
definition of the practice of law has been a largely futile endeavor."). The article continues:
The MDP Commission's Experience with the Model definition doesn't faze [ABA
President Alfred P.] Carlton. "Just because it's a tough question doesn't mean we
shouldn't try to answer it," he says.
[Task Force member Lynda C.] Shely insists that it's worth taking a stab at marking
some basic boundaries for lawyers as well as laypeople who venture into the legal
services field.
"As we've seen in MJP, we need some uniformity," she says. "If you have one state
that says taking a deposition is the practice of law and another that says it isn't,
what's a lawyer supposed to do?"
Id. at 19.
133. See infra Part IV (suggesting a new perspective for evaluating the practice of law).
134. See supra Part I (discussing how the law affects individuals' social and personal
lives); supra Part II (discussing how the definition of the practice of law functions in the legal
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The importance of the definition of the practice of law, however, does not
necessarily lead to the importance of a model definition of the practice of law.
Lawyers, after all, are regulated by the states, and so it would seem to make
sense to leave formulation of the definition to the individual states. 35 There are
other issues, however, that need to be addressed before lawyers shrug off this
burden entirely to the states.
III. The Need for the Legal Community To Formulate a Model Definition
A. The Task Force's Attempts To Formulate a Definition
The American Bar Association (ABA) recently appointed a Task Force to
analyze the need for a model definition of the practice of law.' 36 The Task
Force was challenged:
To determine the best approach for the Association to address whether to
create a model definition of the practice of law that would support the goal
of providing the public with better access to legal services, be in concert
with governmental concerns about anticompetitive restraints, and provide a
basis for effective enforcement of unauthorized practice of law statutes. 1
37
Alfred P. Carlton, former president of the ABA, in testimony before the Federal
Trade Commission, stated that:
[A] threshold problem with the delivery of legal services [is]: What
constitutes legal information as opposed to legal advice? Is the distinction
that legal information can be provided by someone who is not a lawyer
whereas legal advice requires the skill and judgment of someone who is
admitted to practice law? I have appointed an ABA Presidential Task
Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law to provide direction
on this issue. I did so because of the fourway intersection. Where there is
a collision of four issues: MDP, MJP, Access to Legal Services, and the
Unauthorized Practice of Law. When we have properly defined the
practice of law, we will be far better able to determine the unauthorized
practice of law. This is particularly important with the delivery of legal
services market by affecting competition).
135. See, e.g., Julin, supra note 11, at 209 ("Admission to practice and regulation thereafter
are basically a state matter.").
136. See ABA BOARD OF GOVERNORS RESOLUTION, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
model def-home.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2004) (appointing the Task Force on the Model
Definition of the Practice of Law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
137. AMERICAN BAR AssOcIATION, ABA CHALLENGE STATEMENT: MODEL DEFINITION OF
THE PRACTICE OF LAW, at http://www.abanet.orglcpr/modeldefchellenge.html (last visited
Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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services via the Internet because of the proliferation of entities that provide
people with legal assistance online.
138
The Task Force circulated a draft definition "with the goal of stimulating
discussion" on September 18, 2002.139 The draft definition stated that the
practice of law "is the application of legal principles and judgment with regard
to the circumstances or objectives of a person that require the knowledge and
skill of a person trained in the law." 4"'  Several activities presumptively fell
within the practice of law:
(1) Giving advice or counsel to persons as to their legal rights or
responsibilities or to those of others; (2) Selecting, drafting, or completing
legal documents or agreements that affect the legal rights of a person;
(3) Representing a person before an adjudicative body, including, but not
limited to, preparing or filing documents or conducting discovery; or
(4) Negotiating legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of a person.
The definition excluded several service providers from the overall definition of
the practice of law. 142 The definition also subjected any person practicing law
to duties of care and loyalty, required disclosure for any nonlawyer providing
services, and provided liability for the unauthorized practice of law. 1
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The Task Force received several comments on the definition from trade
associations, scholars, lawyers, and the federal government.144 Many of these
comments criticized the definition as overly broad and as creating strong
anticompetitive effects. 45 A public hearing on the definition was held on
138. Possible Anticompetitive Effects to Restrict Competition on the Internet: Federal
Trade Commission Public Workshop, Testimony Before the Federal Trade Commission, Alfred
P. Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Association, at 12 (Oct. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/panelcarlton.pdf.
139. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 2.
140. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE
PRACTICE OF LAW, DRAFT (9/18/02), DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, at
http://www.abanet.orglcpr/model-def definition.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
141. Id.
142. See id. (providing exceptions for those with a limited license, pro se litigants,
mediators, and supervised paraprofessionals).
143. See id. ("Any person engaged in the practice of law shall be held to the same standard
of care and duty of loyalty to the client independent of whether the person is authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.... [I]f the person providing the services is a nonlawyer, the
person shall disclose that fact in writing.").
144. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE
PRACTICE oFLAW, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/draft-def comment.html (last visited
Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
145. See, e.g., Candace Heckman, Who Can Give Advice on Law? Critics Say ABA Limit
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February 7, 2003, at which the Task Force heard statements from nineteen
individuals both applauding and admonishing its efforts.14 Several speakers
expressed the view that a definition of the practice of law was either impossible
or not worth the effort.
147
Could Hurt the Poor and Victims ofAbuse, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 8, 2003, at B 1
(discussing the reaction to the ABA's draft definition). Heckman reports:
While there is clear evidence that consumers have been hurt by lay people
dispensing legal services, the ABA proposal, which would be referred to individual
states to adopt, is "overbroad, " said Charles Harwood, Northwest Director of the
Federal Trade Commission....
Maryland lawyer Richard Granat, who heads the ABA's electronic-lawyering task
force, warned that the new definition might be opposed on constitutional grounds.
"Lawyers don't own the law," Granat said, "Everybody owns the law."
And creating less competition for lawyers may further sully the profession's public
image, he added.
Id.; see also Tamara Loomis, Defining Law Practice: ABA's Proposal Has Many Critics,
Including the Justice Department, N.Y. L. J., Jan. 9, 2003, at 5 (discussing the draft definition).
Loomis writes:
Undeterred by the failed attempts of the past, American Bar Association President
Alfred P. Carlton Jr. last summer appointed a task force to draft a model definition
of the practice of law.
Now, the ABA may be wishing it had left well enough alone. The proposed
definition, which came out in September, has generated a storm of criticism from
the operators of online legal services, real estate agents, paralegals and even local
bars such as the New York County Lawyers' Association, who contend the
definition is unduly broad and unworkable.
Id.; see Maureen Sirhal, Legal Group's Work Could Hurt E-Commerce, NAT'LJ. TECH. DAILY,
Jan. 24, 2003 (discussing the Federal Trade Commission's comment on the draft definition,
which warned that the draft language was too broad and could hinder online commerce). In
response to the comments made by the FTC, Sirhal reports:
The task force's work stems from the ABA's desire to address concerns about
consumers' ability to obtain legal services, according to ABA President Alfred
Carlton. By clearly defining services, he said consumers would have better access
to lawyers and providers of "allied" legal services for transactions like real-estate
closings.
"It is rather ironic, I should think, that the FTC and Department of Justice see some
conspiracy to restrict access to lawyers," Carlton said.
Id.
146. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 2.
147. See Hearing Before the Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law
(Feb. 7, 2003) (commenting on the draft definition), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
model-defltaskforce_transcript.pdf. Such comments include:
Mr. Davis: ... you all have my condolences and commiserations because ... you
have a completely impossible task. You've been sent a conundrum that is
insoluable (sic). If you were going to try to solve it, you cannot do it in the way
that you're trying to do it....
If you feel you must persist in a definition, the only way to define it is subjectively.
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The ultimate recommendation of the Task Force, adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates on August 11, 2003, abandoned the proposed draft
definition and instead recommended that each state adopt a definition of the
practice of law. 48 The recommendation includes a "basic premise that the
practice of law is the application of legal principles and judgment to the
circumstances or objectives of another person or entity," which excludes any
mention of the provider's skills. 149 The background report to the
recommendation expressly states that "[t]his basic premise is not a model for a
definition, but rather a part of a framework."' 150 The report then provides a
procedural framework for the individual states to consider while creating their
own unauthorized practice statutes-the framework deals with determining
who should be authorized to practice law, not with determining what
constitutes the practice of law.15 1 The report suggests that the individual states
should consider the minimum qualifications, competence, and accountability of
those who would be authorized to practice law. 52 States should undertake
studies of potential harm and should continually review the definition in order
to "take into account changing market factors... with an eye to the future."'
' 53
If the client reasonably believes they have engaged a lawyer, they're getting legal
services. If the person providing the service is not holding themselves out as a
lawyer, they should be permitted to do it.
Id. at 73-74.
I commend and commiserate with this Task Force and its fundamental task. It is
truly daunting to come up with a uniform and all-encompassing definition of the
practice of law. And courts, including the Arizona Supreme Court, and
commentators like Professor Rhodes, and others who are far more experienced and
wise than I, have concluded that it's just impossible to do. And I think the draft
that the Task Force has put before us, based largely on the definition here in
Washington, really reflects that reality ....
The practice of law, which only trained and licensed lawyers can engage in, is the
provision of those legal services which, "require the knowledge and skill of one
trained in the law." It's really pretty circular.
Id. at 140-41.
148. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 3 ("Upon further deliberation, the Task
Force became convinced that the considerations in defining the practice of law in each
jurisdiction required that a procedural framework for jurisdictions to follow be recommended
instead.").
149. Id. at 13.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 5-8.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 12.
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B. The Task Force's Efforts in Perspective
The substance of the Task Force's recommendation and background
report is somewhat helpful. The broad premise that the practice of law is the
application of judgment to the circumstances of another basically asserts that
the practice of law is the giving of legal advice. This is tantamount to saying
that the practice of law is a professional service.' 54 Of course, understanding
that legal professionals practice law is a useful, if somewhat obvious, starting
point. 55 The factors provided for determining the unauthorized practice of
law are also useful as a basis for determining the proper scope of the
definition. 5 6 However, the actual procedure the Task Force followed-a
procedure consisting primarily of reflection and consultation-provides a more
helpful framework for developing a model definition. As will be discussed
below, the procedure also demonstrates one of the reasons why the legal
professional community needs to formulate a definition of the practice of
law.1
57
154. Cf. Kritzer, supra note 16, at 717 (discussing the sociological approach to defining a
profession and stating that "[p]rofessions are specific occupational groups that are at a minimum
defined as 'exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular
cases"').
155. Cf. Daniel B. Evans, Unauthorized Practice of Law (ABA Style), DEATH, TAXES, AND
LAW: COMMENTARIES, at http://evans-legal.com/dan/blawg.html#UPL-ABA (last visited Oct.
10, 2004) (criticizing the Task Force's ultimate Report) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Law Review). Evans writes:
So the Task Force is NOT recommending a definition of the practice of law, but
only a "basic premise" that should be included in whatever definition "every
jurisdiction" adopts. Does this "basic premise" have enough substance to debate?
Is there any there there?... [T]he second draft is more vulnerable to criticism
because it makes no attempt to propose any exceptions or limitations whatsoever.
Even the accompanying report does little to dispel the presumption that the
"practice of law" is what lawyers do and that the definition should be as broad as
possible to "protect the public" against those who are not lawyers.... If there really
are public interests to be protected, and if a definition of the practice of law is
necessary to protect those public interests, why can't the ABA produce a REAL
definition? Is there some kind of deadline that must be met? Why not spend the
effort to do the job right and develop a definition that can withstand close scrutiny
and serve as a model or framework for the protection of the public?
Id.
156. See infra Part IV (articulating suggestions for a model definition of the practice of
law, including a suggestion that the definition should focus on whether the activity should be
regulated in the public's interest).
157. See infra Part IH.E (discussing the legal community's need to formulate a definition in
order to ensure its voice in the reform debate and suggesting that the procedural framework
undertaken by the Task Force is a good example of how that definition should come about).
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Although the Task Force was criticized as trying to promote the legal
monopoly and to protect lawyers' self-interest, the Task Force should be
commended for its efforts and for its decision not to attempt to promulgate an
overly broad rule. The legal profession, however, is still left with the task of
formulating an ultimate model definition. Some of the more important reasons
for formulating a model definition will be briefly discussed below. These
reasons include the diminishing role of jurisdictional boundaries, 158 the legal
profession's need to justify its position in the eyes of the public, 159 and the legal
profession's need to ensure its voice in the reform of the legal services
market. 160
C. The Diminishing Role of Jurisdictional Boundaries
As mentioned previously, the nature of traditional law practice has
changed. 161  The increasing complexity of law calls for increased
specialization. 162  Traditional ways of delivering legal services have also
changed: Law practice is becoming more national in scope. 63 Legal
transactions and issues frequently cross state boundaries as commercial and
personal mobility increases, and the regulation of law practice must begin to
reflect these modem changes. 64
158. See infra Part III.C (arguing that a model definition could bring uniformity to
inconsistencies caused, in part, by the diminishing role of jurisdictional boundaries).
159. See infra Part III.D (discussing the need for lawyers to ensure their claims to exclusive
power are seen as legitimate).
160. See infra Part HLI.E (discussing the need for lawyers to formulate a model definition
because of its importance in the reform of the legal services market).
161. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussing traditional law practice and
how the nature of law practice has changed in modem society).
162. See generally SusSKiND, supra note 1 (discussing the increasing need for
specialization in the law because of the added complexity of law).
163. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and need for
multijurisdictional practice).
164. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. Rev. 335, 344
(1994) (arguing that changes in law practice call for uniform professional regulation of the legal
profession). Zacharias states:
The bar's expansion has been accompanied by changes in the provision of legal
services. To service increasingly mobile individual clients and national commercial
clients, lawyers and firms have broadened their practices. Most major firms
maintain branch offices in several states. Virtually all lawyers have become
accustomed to representing clients in multistate transactions and litigation.
Lawyers no longer can afford to confine their activities to local courts...
servicing clients in more routine matters requires local lawyers to offer advice and
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Increasing use of the Internet and information technology provides an
avenue for offering affordable and widespread legal services to the public. 65
Internet services are not constrained by state lines and can potentially be
accessed from any jurisdiction, making regulation of the practice of law over
the Internet difficult.166 Lawyers and nonlawyers are potentially subject to
inconsistent obligations based on inconsistent definitions of the practice of law,
determining what legal services they may perform without fear of unauthorized
practice liability. 67 A unified vision of the definition of the practice of law
would certainly assist in the development of nationalized services and would
bring clarity to the growing "gray area" created by inconsistent rights and
obligations.
168
D. Legitimatizing the Profession's Claims to Exclusive
Knowledge and Power
The discussion of the debate underlying UPL mentioned how the public
has lost faith in lawyers. 169 The controversy surrounding State Bar v. Arizona
representation that cross state lines. The practices of both multistate law firms and
less ambitious practitioners thus have become national in nature.
Id. at 342-43.
165. See generally SUSSKIND, supra note 1 (advocating a large role for information
technology in the future of legal services delivery); Cynthia L. Fountaine, When Is a Computer
a Lawyer?: Interactive Legal Software, Unauthorized Practice of Law, and the First
Amendment, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 147 (2002) (discussing whether legal software constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law and arguing for a place for legal software in the future regulation of
the practice of law); Richard S. Zembek, Note, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental
Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 339 (1996)
(discussing the vast use of cyberspace and describing the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
legal disputes arising in cyberspace).
166. See generally Joel Michael Schwarz, Practicing Law over the Internet: Sometimes
Practice Doesn't Make Perfect, 14 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 657,658 (2001) (providing "a road map
through the jurisdictional quagmire associated with determining whether a particular lawyer's
activities on the Internet constitute the unauthorized practice of law, and, if so, where that
attorney may be prosecuted").
167. See supra note 19 (surveying various state definitions of the practice of law). See
generally Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Technology, Inc., No. Civ.A.
3:97CV-2859H, 1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacatedand remandedby 179 F.3d
956 (5th Cir. 1999) (enjoining a computer program, Quicken Family Lawyer, from distribution
in Texas).
168. See Loomis, supra note 145, at 5 (stating that New York County Lawyers'
Association President Michael Miller said that "he thought a uniform definition would be a
useful concept, 'particularly in the movement in the profession toward multi-jurisdictional
practice"').
169. See supra Part II.A.1.c (discussing the negative image of the legal profession in the
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Land Title and Trust Co. 170 is illustrative of this public sentiment. In Arizona
Land Title, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the practice of law was "those
acts, whether performed in court or in the law office, which lawyers
customarily have carried on from day to day," including legal document
preparation, legal advice, and adjudicative representation. 171 Real estate agents
were barred from practicing law, and in the ensuing backlash, Arizona citizens
amended their state constitution to include the right of real estate agents to draft
and complete contracts and other documents in real estate transactions. 1
72
Although the public generally has a negative view of lawyers as a group,
members of the public do trust individual lawyers to a large extent and will
frequently seek a lawyer's assistance. 173 At the same time, the public believes
that lawyers play an unnecessary role in many routine legal transactions.
174
This contradiction might be explained by understanding that the public will
eyes of the public); see also Buchanan, supra note 124, at 564-66 (discussing the negative
image of the profession and the public's mistrust of lawyers).
170. State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1961). In Arizona
Land Title, the Arizona Supreme Court considered whether several realty and title companies
engaged in the practice of law by preparing legal documents and giving legal advice. Id at 4.
The court also considered whether the companies' activity, by being incidental to the long
established customs of the industry, did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Id at 5.
The court examined the historical role of the attorney as a profession to discuss the importance
of ensuring ethical and intellectual competence in the legal services market. Id. at 6-9.
Although the court stated that "it is impossible to lay down an exhaustive definition of 'the
practice of law' by attempting to enumerate every conceivable act performed by lawyers in the
normal course of their work," it proceeded to define the practice of law. Id. at 8-9. The court
determined that the practice of law is "those acts, whether performed in court or in the law
office, which lawyers customarily carried on from day to day." Id. at 10. The court rejected the
contention that the preparation of legal documents was incidental to title insurance activity and
so was not the unauthorized practice of law, and also rejected the notion that an activity could
not be the practice of law because the bar had long acquiesced in nonlawyers performing that
activity. Id. at 12-13. The court went on to enjoin the companies from performing a large
amount of activities held to be the practice of law. Id. at 14-15.
171. Id. at 9-10.
172. See ARiz. CONST. art. XXVI (granting licensed real estate brokers the right to perform
certain legal tasks). For an in-depth examination and continuation of this ongoing saga, see
generally Jonathan Rose, Unauthorized Practice of Law in Arizona: A Legal and Political
Problem That Won't Go Away, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585 (2002).
173. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 87, at 6-7 (discussing how the public, although
dissatisfied with lawyers in general, are often very satisfied with their own lawyers and stating
that "[p]eople hate a hired gun until they need one of their own").
174. See id. at 3-4 ("About three-fifths of Americans describe attorneys as greedy, and
between half and three-quarters believe that they charge excessive fees. There is even broader
agreement that lawyers handle many matters that could be resolved as well and with less
expense by nonlawyers.").
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accept lawyers' claims to superior knowledge and skill, and therefore the
exclusive authority or power to act, in many situations. The Arizona
experience shows, however, that the public does not see lawyers' claims to
exclusive authority as legitimate in all situations. 175 Thus, lawyers' claims to
exclusive authority will be accepted by the public as legitimate in certain
situations and in a certain realm of activities, such as complex transactions or
representation before a court, but not in all situations, such as routine
transactions or representation before an administrative agency. 76 Lawyers'
claims to legitimate, exclusive authority will grow weaker as those claims
encompass more activities over which the public believes lawyers lack superior
knowledge and skill.
The activities in which lawyers claim to have exclusive authority are those
activities that fall within the sphere of the practice of law. When a certain
activity is considered to be the practice of law, unauthorized practice of law
rules create a legal monopoly over that activity.' 77 Lawyers therefore claim
exclusive authority over that activity. 78 If the definition of the practice
175. Perlman, supra note 30, at 1017-18 (noting that although the legal profession should
not be overly concerned with public image when crafting regulation, there are many
circumstances where it is appropriate for the legal profession to pay attention to public opinion,
such as opinion over scandals). Perlman states that "if the profession ignores these types of
criticism, it risks losing control over some of its rulemaking authority." Id. at 1017 n.239.
176. See infra note 178 (discussing how the success of a profession's claims to authority is
contingent on its ability to gain legitimacy in that demand by establishing its expertise over a
given area of work).
177. See supra Part H (discussing the relationship between the practice of law and the
unauthorized practice of law and illustrating how that relationship creates a legal monopoly over
the legal services market).
178. Terence Halliday explains how professional claims to authority are justified:
It is clear that the extent of influence that a profession may wield is not fixed and
immutable. A profession is not simply endowed with control over a given area of
work. A domain of influence must be created by the profession itself....
[P]rofessional influence can expand and contract depending on the success of the
profession in asserting its "rights" over various kinds of work and in insinuating its
counsel into the policy-making of various social institutions, a process that
inevitably engages it in conflict with other groups pressing contrary claims. Like
other professions, therefore, the legal profession in the last century has been
committed to a policy of professional expansionism, both in the areas of work over
which it claims a monopoly, and, more important, in the affairs of its institutions,
including, but not limited to, the judiciary.
The extent and success of a profession's expansionism is contingent, therefore, in
the first instance, on the ability of the profession to establish its expert
credentials-to gain legitimacy for its demand that the profession confronts esoteric
and complex problems and that the resolution of those problems must be limited to
those persons with requisite education, training, and certification. The
complexity of professional skills has been reinforced by professions that have
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of law encompasses virtually any type of legal service, then the definition will
include many services to which lawyers have weak claims of legitimate
authority. The public is encouraged to distrust lawyers when lawyers are seen
as overreaching, and it begins to question the legal monopoly, especially when
the needs for legal services of many are unmet.179 Nonlawyers successfully
providing many of the services falling within the definition makes that
overreaching even clearer in the eyes of the public, and this further weakens the
legal profession's claims to exclusive authority to act.
For example, suppose that it is determined to be in the public's interest to
limit all title searches to lawyers. Once title searching falls within the definition
of the practice of law, lawyers have exclusive power in all title searches, and
nonlawyers are forbidden from performing title searches. Most of the general
public, however, does not believe that only lawyers are qualified to perform
title searches. Nonlawyers are believed to be equally able to perform title
searches. The public therefore distrusts lawyers' claims to exclusive authority
in the area of title searches; the claim is not seen as legitimate. The public is
further encouraged to distrust lawyers in general, especially when many
individuals cannot afford title searches because of uncompetitive prices.
Clearly and narrowly defining the practice of law clarifies claims to
legitimate authority, and a clear and narrow definition may, therefore improve
the image of the profession in the eyes of the public. The public may be
tempted to strip away some of lawyers' claims if it feels the claims have gone
too far, as demonstrated in Arizona. 18 Much of the legal monopoly may be
stripped away if lawyers continue to insist on exclusive authority in many
activities to which they have weak, illegitimate claims. If the public is
encouraged to distrust lawyers enough, then it may even strip lawyers
of exclusive authority over those services which should be restricted and
gained statutory mandates to exclude unauthorized practitioners.
TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL
EMPOWERMENT 44-45 (1987).
179. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 131, at 55 (discussing recent unauthorized practice of law
enforcement activity). Baker quotes Phil Shuey, co-chair of the ABA Law Practice
Management Section's Futurist Committee, who states: "If we overuse unauthorized practice,
the appearance is that all we're trying to do is protect our monopoly. There is a real danger
there. It fosters distrust. ... [T]he bar should choose challenges carefully and focus on whether
the public is being misled." Id.
180. See infra note 184 (discussing Joseph Julin's warning to the legal profession that if
the profession does not increase access then nonlawyers will be authorized by the public to
practice law); see also supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text (discussing the Arizona
experience with the unauthorized practice of law).
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regulated in the public's interest.181 By narrowing the definition and clarifying
what activities are encompassed within lawyers' exclusive authority, the legal
profession's image could be improved in the eyes of the public. The profession
could be seen as relinquishing some of its overbroad claims to exclusive
authority. Lawyers should re-evaluate what services the profession will claim
as its exclusive province in light of public perception as well as public interest
because:
IT]he public will permit the cartel to exist, or go unregulated by itself, only
if the public and its representatives, the government, perceive that
"adequate" service is being provided at a "fair" price. Thus, one of the
cartel's problems is to convince the public and the government that the
profession is indeed so providing and, moreover, that the self-regulatory
organization, the cartel, is necessary and beneficial to the public.
r 2
The public will only accept lawyers' monopoly over the legal services market if
it believes the monopoly is necessary and beneficial to the public.
Legitimatizing the legal profession's claims to exclusive power in certain
activities is therefore one very important reason for the legal profession to draft
a model definition of the practice of law.
E. A Strong Voice: Lawyers' Participation in the Formulation
of a Definition
The legal profession may have to relinquish much of its legal monopoly in
defining the practice of law. The need to restructure the delivery of legal
services to increase access and the need to legitimatize the claims of the
profession in the eyes of the public will probably warrant a narrow definition of
the practice of law.1 83 Of course, this is a decision that should be made after
181. Cf Peter Megargee Brown, The Decline of Lawyers' Professional Independence, in
ROBERT S. ALEXANDER ET AL., THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT
THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 23, 25-30 (1984) (discussing threats to the legal profession's
self-regulation). As Brown argues:
[P]rofessionalism and independence are synonymous. If the American bar does not
do its duty to the public good, the administration of justice, and the aspirations of
the profession, then its trust will be taken away and public regulation will soon be
making decisions for the profession which the profession should be making for
itself. The choice is ours. The time is now.
Id. at 31.
182. Horowitz, supra note 54, at 10-11.
183. See supra Part II.A. 1.c (discussing the argument for a narrow definition of the practice
of law); supra Part I1.D (discussing the need to legitimatize lawyers' claims to exclusive
power); see also Johnstone, supra note 11, at 818-19 (discussing that, although the
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considerable study and deliberation. This is another reason why the legal
profession needs to articulate a model definition. Lawyers need to provide a
model definition of the practice of law in order to ensure the legal profession's
voice in the discussion.'
4
Lawyers enjoy a large amount of autonomy in the regulation of their
profession, and independence of professional judgment is highly valued in the
professional community.185  The definition of the practice of law might
profoundly affect the regulation of legal services. 8 6 MDP, MJP, and UPL
reforms all have potentially drastic effects on the amount and type of
competition in the market, which in turn affects lawyers' incomes. 87 Lawyers
unauthorized practice of law debate has been rather quiet, "the prolonged and relatively
quiescent period in reforming and enforcing unauthorized practice of law may be coming to an
end"). Johnstone continues: "The market for legal services is too important for so much of the
law as to who may participate in that market to remain indefinitely so ambiguous, uncertain and
unenforced." Id. at 818.
184. Joseph R. Julin presented an argument, warning, and premonition to the legal
profession, similar to the one presented here, over twenty-four years ago:
Unless the costs of practicing law and rendering legal services are dramatically
curtailed, the practice of law will decrease in scope. Access to the legal system, as
we have known it in the last decades, has become prohibitive for ever-increasing
numbers of people not commonly defined as indigent. For many in need of more
than "simple" or even "routine" legal counsel, there is a growing reluctance to
become involved with a lawyer unless real trouble is afoot. If the legal profession
does not do more than in the past to increase productivity while maintaining
reasonable standards of practice, I believe the void will be filled by persons not
fully trained in the practice of law being authorized to perform so-called routine,
perhaps more than routine, lawyerlike tasks.
I do not mean to argue that we, as members of the legal profession, should cling to
some notion of territorial integrity in areas now known as the practice of law which
might well be handled by others in an effective and less costly way. I believe,
however, that lawyers should continue to be in the forefront of this reform.
Lawyers must be neither bystanders nor obstacles. In short, the profession must use
its collective imagination to provide cost-effective vehicles for the delivery of
adequate "legal services" at a price the individual can afford to pay. If the
profession does not, others in the name of and at the demand of the consumer will
be authorized to do so.
Julin, supra note 11, at 208.
185. See generally Gordon, supra note 80 (discussing what is meant by lawyers'
professional independence, evaluating claims that independence has declined, and determining
the conditions under which independence will flourish).
186. See supra Part H.A (discussing the relationship between the definition of the practice
of law and the market for legal services).
187. Lawyers may have a strong incentive to oppose the opening of much of the legal
services market because of the potential loss of income:
Any lowering of entry barriers would be disastrous to existing lawyers who will
have relied upon the current rate of pay for legal services to repay these sunk costs.
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should have a sincere interest in how the services they provide are delivered. If
any reforms are to be made, then the legal community should want to have a
voice in their making.
88
Christine Parker, in her study on access to justice and the legal
profession, conducted a survey that evaluated lawyers' responses to structural
If entry barriers shrank, and the price of legal services dropped, these lawyers
would experience a devastating loss on their investment to become a lawyer. As
such, arguments considering the "quality" of the bar aside, lawyers will fight tooth
and nail before a flood of lower-priced competitors enters every area of the legal
market.
Barton, supra note 57, at 489. Statements like these, however, ignore that not all lawyers are
profit-oriented and that many genuinely care about the best interests of the public:
I know that to many it will seem incredible that lawyers in a position to make a lot
of money would sacrifice it to other goods. "If that's what it takes," they will say,
"forget it." All I can do is point out that historically lawyers have sacrificed income
repeatedly. I will give only a few examples among many. In the midst of his
extremely lucrative practice, Hamilton took time off to hold public office, even
though he had no other source of income and died without enough to pay his debts.
Brandeis articulated an explicit theory that the purpose of private practice income
was to permit the independent lawyers to engage in public causes; he followed his
own preaching, living ascetically and taking on his major public causes without
fee.... Today, lawyers still trade law-firm partnerships for judgeships or
administrative posts paying a quarter to a tenth as much.
Gordon, supra note 80, at 40.
188. For example, Quintin Johnstone foresees continued activity in the unauthorized
practice of law debate. He presents possible future situations that might change the legal
services market:
The market for legal services is so big, so profitable, and legal restrictions on
unauthorized law practice so seldom enforced that participation in that market is
attractive to many legal service providers despite the apparent illegality of their
legal services work.... The continued violations of laws as important as those
regulating who may provide legal services, and the ambiguity in important aspects
of those laws, cannot continue indefinitely without far more extensive law
enforcement or law reform efforts .... If the bar does not initiate a major move
against its competitors, one or more of the big nonlawyer occupations active in
providing legal services may attempt to change the basic legal underpinnings of
unauthorized practice law. They may believe this is necessary if they are to expand
their legal service activities even more extensively. Additionally, they may
conclude that the time has arrived for them to seek legal validation of their
established position in the legal services market; that they are so entrenched in that
market that government law-making bodies are now certain to support changes in
the law that will fully and clearly approve their current legal services activities.
What precise event or events will trigger these major efforts to attain
comprehensive change in the enforcement or reform of unauthorized practice laws
are not predictable this far in advance but sooner or later will occur.
Johnstone, supra note 11, at 841-42.
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reforms of the legal profession. 189 The study demonstrated that lawyers are
much more willing to cooperate with structural reforms of the legal profession
when they feel they have a voice in the reform discussion, and Parker points
out:
In the Australian case study, engaging the legal profession in dialogue
proved effective in converting lawyers through debates where their view
was heard, but where it was not necessarily the predominant one. Some
lawyers were responsive to such dialogue simply to maintain legitimacy in
the eyes of the community. Others opened their minds to the ideas of
reformers and were persuaded by their merits. Yet voluntary change was
most common where persuasive dialogue was accompanied by a perception
of the inexorability of the reform process. For some, inexorability was
about the power of commercial consumers to force competition. For others
it was about the determination of reformers who had power in a climate of
micro-economic reform to introduce change. Conversely, attempts to force
change without dialogue produced unnecessary resistance to reform and
entrenched conservatism among lawyers. When reformers seemed to
assume that the profession had not and would not reform itself, or where
reformers seemed to refuse to listen to lawyers' perspectives on their own
profession, lawyers experienced reform proposals as illegitimate insult.
The apparent inexorability of reform became a goad to defiance and
reactance.190
Lawyers are also in a unique position to assess the characteristics of various
legal services and have experience in dealing with the intricacies of the law.
Any reform that the definition of the practice of law may bring to the legal
services market will benefit from professional views.' 9 '
Procedural strategies for formulating a definition of the practice of law
similar to the Task Force's deliberation and consultation provide an excellent
forum for articulating lawyers' concerns. 192 The process of formulating a
model definition would provide an excellent opportunity for consultation within
the legal community as to what constitutes the practice of law, and a model
definition would provide an example that could spark and guide debate in the
individual states. 193  Organizations such as the ABA have the potential
189. See PARKER, supra note 2, at 124-39 (discussing the survey).
190. Id. at 137.
191. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 80, at 75 (discussing lawyers' competence to participate
in political reform). See contra Rhode, supra note 46, at 61 (arguing that lawyers are not in any
special position to determine the level of risk consumers are willing to assume in legal services).
192. See supra Part IH.A-B (discussing the Task Force's efforts and stating that the
procedure the Task Force followed was a helpful example for the process of formulating a
model definition of the practice of law).
193. Terence Halliday points out that the legal profession's technical authority over the
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of providing a strong voice in reform debates. 94 Although any model
definition would have to be adopted by the individual states to have any
enforceability, a model definition--drafted by the legal profession to reflect the
profession's concerns-would at the very least promote a feeling of
professional participation in the reform process. Ensuring lawyer participation
in the reform debate is another reason why it would be in the best interest of the
legal profession to formulate a model definition.
IV. Suggestions for a Model Definition
Defining the practice of law is admittedly a difficult task. The difficulty of
producing a definition is increased, however, because attempts to define the
practice of law often approached the task from the wrong perspective. Many
definitions attempted to siphon off individual practice of law activities from the
myriad stew of activities lawyers perform in their professional lives. This
approach seeks to determine what exactly is the "essence" of being a lawyer. 195
These definitions ask: What is it that a lawyer does that is the practice of law?
How is the practice of law distinguished from all the many legal services
law creates a unique opportunity for the profession to exert moral authority over the law:
The uniqueness of the legal profession largely inheres in the fact that it has
technical authority in a normative system, namely, the law. Because the distinction
between what is technical and what is normative in the law becomes very opaque,
the legal profession has an unusual opportunity to exercise moral authority in the
name of technical advice. It can move with such an easy facility between one form
of authority and another that even bar leaders become uncertain as to the bounds of
their expert role.
HALLIDAY, supra note 178, at 41. In other words, because of the both moral and technical
nature of law, the technical mastery of lawyers over the law makes it easier for lawyers to exert
their authority over the moral nature of law, that is, public policy. Id. at 39-41. Halliday
continues by pointing out that "effective professional influence requires collective professional
action .... Bar associations.., become intervening links in a logic of action extending from
epistemology to power." Id. at 47.
194. See, e.g., Keatinge, supra note 17, at 771 (discussing changes in the legal services
market, including nonlawyer intrusion into the heretofore-exclusive province of attorneys). As
Keatinge states: "It seems unlikely that the ABA will provide the last word on these issues.
Nonetheless, to the extent the ABA is willing to approach the questions that need to be
addressed thoughtfully, it may be able to provide insight that should be considered by the states
and the lawyers...." Id.
195. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 46, at 82 (discussing the traditional standard of defining
the practice of law, which seeks to determine what activities have customarily been practiced by
attorneys); see also supra note 170 (discussing the approach taken by the Arizona Supreme
Court in defining the practice of law by looking at the acts lawyers customarily perform in the
profession).
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lawyers provide? Once an activity falls within the definition of the practice of
law, the approach seeks to determine whether a particular nonlawyer can
competently perform the service. The Task Force's report and
recommendations reflect this approach-it seeks to determine the common
theme underlying lawyers' services. 196 The report then provides a framework
for evaluating who can provide legal advice and under what circumstances. 197
This approach to defining the practice of law, which this Note will call the
"lawyer-centered" perspective, is inefficient and produces arbitrary and vague
results.
The lawyer-centered perspective assumes that a lawyer is needed to
provide all legal services, except when the service is sufficiently innocuous that
a nonlawyer could practice without posing an undue risk of harm. 198 This
perspective leads to an extremely inefficient conception of the practice of law.
Each potential provider has to be judged and weighed in order to determine
whether she is deemed competent to provide each legal service. This deliberate
weighing of the costs and benefits of each service in relation to each provider is
extremely inefficient. The varied and rapidly changing nature of legal services
makes wholescale evaluation of the potential harm to the entire legal services
market almost impossible.199 Alternative forms of delivery and alternative
providers would each have to be evaluated whenever they arise, and innovation
would be severely inhibited because these providers would each require
authorization before they could legally enter the market. Under a lawyer-
centered perspective, the best approach to defining the practice of law would
probably be on a case-by-case basis, evaluating the risk of harm whenever that
harm rears its ugly head.2° Under these circumstances, the definition of the
practice of law is almost impossible to define.
196. See Part III.A-B (discussing and critiquing the Task Force's efforts).
197. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 4 ("Inherent in the drafting and selection
of legal documents is the provision of legal advice. Inherent in the representation of another
before a court is the provision of legal advice.").
198. See, e.g., State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 575 P.2d 943,949 (N.M. 1978)
(holding that, although nonlawyers may fill in the blanks of legal forms, preparing documents
affecting substantial rights requires "the legal skill and knowledge greater than that possessed by
the average citizen" and so constitutes the practice of law and is restricted to lawyers).
199. Cf State Bar v. Butterfield, 111 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Neb. 1961) ("While an all-
embracing definition of the term 'practicing law' would involve great difficulty, it is generally
defined as the giving of advice .... In an ever-changing economic and social order, the
'practice of law' must necessarily change, making it practically impossible to formulate an
enduring definition.").
200. Cf supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing a common case-by-case
approach to defining the practice of law frequently utilized by courts who express the sentiment
that formulating a definition to fit all situations is impossible).
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A lawyer-centered approach also has the potential of creating extremely
vague definitions. The lawyer-centered perspective attempts to abstractly
determine what the essence of lawyering is. The perspective often admits that
the practice of law does not encompass everything a lawyer does, but it is
difficult to draw an abstract distinction.20 ' The result is a muddy "I do not
know how to define it, but I know it when I see it" approach to the definition of
the practice of law. There are many reasons that make a clear definition
desirable. For example, a definition of the practice of law may possibly be
struck down as unconstitutionally vague.20 2 The definition also needs to be
clear enough to allow legal service providers to act without significant
hesitation. If nonlawyers are allowed to provide legal services, then nonlawyers
must know what services they can perform without fear of liability.203 A vague
definition will make nonlawyers hesitant to participate in the legal marketplace,
and any efficiency that comes from nonlawyer participation will be stymied.
Finally, any definition formulated from a lawyer-centered perspective has
the potential of being extremely arbitrary. Consider, for example, the Task
Force's distinction that the essence of practicing law is legal advice.2°4 Almost
any activity related in any small way to legal rights could fit within a legal
advice definition. As long as a service is tailored to fit a particular situation, it
involves legal advice and will constitute the practice of law.205 The provision
of so-called legal information, as opposed to legal advice, is not the practice of
201. See, e.g., Cardinal v. Merrill Lynch Realty/Burnet, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Minn.
1988) (stating that although the practice of law cannot be defined precisely, "lawyers should be
the first to recognize that between the two there is a region wherein much of what lawyers do
every day in their practice may also be done by others without wrongful invasion of the lawyers'
field").
202. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Comm'n on Unauthorized Practice of Law v. Sturgeon,
635 N.W.2d 679,681-82 (Iowa 2001) (rejecting a challenge to the definition of the practice of
law based on EC 3-5 as unconstitutionally vague and defining the practice of law as "relat[ing]
to the rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer").
Professor Rhode also contends that the unauthorized practice of law, as infringement on
nonlawyer First Amendment rights, must be the least restrictive alternative for accomplishing
the state's interest in safeguarding the public. Rhode, supra note 46, at 62-71, 94.
203. Cf. Sturgeon, 635 N.W.2d at 685 (stating that "to pass a vagueness test a statute must
be 'set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently
understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest"' (quoting Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)).
204. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 4 (discussing how the broad basic premise
for defining the practice of law is providing legal advice).
205. See id. (defining the practice of law as the giving of legal advice which is the
application of legal principles and judgment to the circumstances or objectives of another
person).
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law. After all, lawyers do not get paid by their clients for reciting the Uniform
Commercial Code.
The distinction between legal advice and legal information is almost
meaningless when discussing nonlawyer participation in the marketplace. To
recall the example in Part U.B, the Woodhouses would not seek out Mahogany
if all he could do is hand them a copy of Forest State Statutes at Large.2 At the
very least Mahogany should hand the Woodhouses a copy of the Children with
Disabilities Education Act. But by pointing the Woodhouses to a particular
advantageous law, Mahogany just tailored his services to fit the Woodhouses'
situation and gave them legal advice.
Even if the lawyer-centered perspective takes a more realistic view of the
legal services market, the legal advice distinction is still arbitrary. Court clerks,
for example, are often accosted by the public with questions about their legal
situation. 207 Clerks, who are allowed to give out legal information but not legal
advice, are cautioned against using the word "should" in their answer and
instead provide information about what the litigant "can" do.2°8 Although the
linguistic variation between what a person "can" do and what a person "should"
do may mean a lot in legal terms, this fine distinction may be lost on
unsophisticated litigants.2°9
The legal monopoly is unjustified in much of the legal services market.
Requiring the use of a lawyer for many legal services is inefficient, expensive,
206. See supra Part 11.B (using the Woodhouse hypothetical situation to demonstrate the
effect of the definition of the practice of law on the legal services market).
207. Cf Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987, 1992
(1999) ("Unrepresented litigants typically will encounter a variety of court personnel during the
course of their cases, beginning with clerks in the clerk's office.").
208. See id. at 1994 (discussing how clerks are forbidden from giving legal advice). Engler
continues:
The ease with which courts announce the rule prohibiting advice-giving belies the
difficulties in understanding and applying the rule. Some courts have sought to
distinguish between the giving of legal advice, which is prohibited, and the giving
of legal information, which is not. Another opinion indicates that clerks may
identify options, but may not assist the litigant in choosing among the options....
Notwithstanding the various efforts to help clerks draw the line, one clerk's candid
assessment resonates from jurisdiction to jurisdiction: "We have been told here...
not to give 'legal advice' but I have never heard this term defined so I do struggle
with what to tell [pro se litigants] ... because sometimes this can be a fine line."
Id. (quoting Pro Se Issues & Answers: An On-line Forum, FJC Directions, June 1996, at 33-
34).
209. Cf id. (discussing how one scholar suggests that clerks are unable to identify what
constitutes legal advice and arguing that the phrase "legal advice" has no inherent meaning).
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and detrimental to access to justice.21 ° Subjecting the legal services market to
free market forces, however, is also detrimental to access to justice.2 1 1 For
reasons explored above, the assurance of competency in some legal services is
important to safeguard the interests of the consumer and of society at large.2t2
There may also be important reasons for forbidding court clerks to dispense
legal advice on important legal matters.213 However, the approach that has
previously determined whether or not a clerk can provide legal advice, the
lawyer-centered perspective, is not the best way to articulate or determine those
reasons.
An alternative approach to defining the practice of law is an "activity-
centered" perspective. Instead of focusing on whether licensed providers
usually performed that activity, that is, whether that activity is inherent in what
they do, the definition of the practice of law should focus on the activity itself.
The activity-centered approach seeks to determine whether any particular
activity should be licensed without regard to the performer's ability.
The definition of the practice of law seeks to protect the public from
incompetently rendered services by restricting the performance of that activity
to licensed providers.23 4 By regulating licensed providers and restricting the
activity to those providers, the state is indirectly regulating the activity itself.2
As such, when determining whether an activity should fit within the definition
of the practice of law, the state should seek to determine whether that activity
should be regulated; whether that activity should be licensed. The activity-
centered approach asks a fundamental question-is the risk of harm of this
activity severe enough to demand licensure? If the answer is yes, then the
210. See supra Part II.A.l.b (discussing how rules barring nonlawyer involvement increase
the price for legal services, thereby making access to legal guidance unaffordable).
211. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (arguing that leaving consumers exposed
to high risks does not fit well with a society that idealizes equal justice for all).
212. See supra Part Il.A. L.c (discussing the need for a narrow definition of the practice of
law, where many activities are open to competition, but some are relegated to licensed
providers).
213. Cf. Margaret F. Brown, Note, Domestic Violence Advocates' Exposure to Liability for
Engaging in the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 34 CoLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 279,286 (2001)
("A number of studies have revealed that 'court clerks offer victims very limited assistance, and
that a substantial number actually discourage petitioners from filing for protective orders, much
less inform them of additional remedies to pursue."') (quoting Deborah Epstein, Effective
Intervention in Domestic Violence Court: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutor, Judges and the
Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMiISM 3, 26 (1998)).
214. See supra Part I.A. l.a (discussing the reasons for restricting the practice of law to
licensed providers).
215. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the function of the practice of
law as regulating legal services).
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activity will fall within the definition of the practice of law. Unlike the lawyer-
centered approach, however, the activity-centered approach does not assume
that a lawyer will be needed to provide most, if not all, services related to legal
rights. Instead, the activity-centered approach assumes that a nonlawyer can
provide all legal services, except when the service poses a severe risk of harm
such that the activity should be restricted to licensed lawyers to minimize that
harm.
Ideally, the activity-centered perspective should be empirically based. The
approach considers a certain service, such as title searches. The activity-
centered approach then takes into account the severity of the imperfections in
the market for that particular service. First, the activity-centered approach asks:
Is the risk of harm from incompetently rendered title searches such that it ought
to be licensed? The risk of harm consists of both the potential harm to the
consumer and the potential harm to society at large. For example, many risks
are not without remedy, so it would be wise to open competition in these low-
risk activities, while licensing high-risk or irremediable activities.216 Second,
the activity-centered approach asks: Is the asymmetry of information and
understanding between the client and the provider severe enough that a
potential client could not appreciate the risk of harm? Some risks are
comprehensible by clients, and many clients may wish to waive the assurance
of competency in exchange for more affordable service. At the same time,
however, a client may not always be able to appreciate the severity of the risk of
harm, 21 7 and so these nonwaiveable, "high-risk" services should be licensed in
order to ensure competent service.
When evaluating court representation through an activity-centered
approach, the risk of harm to the consumer and the risk of harm to society at
large from incompetent service should be weighed. For example, the potential
risk of harm to the consumer from incompetent court representation might be
216. Cf. Barton, supra note 57, at 440 (discussing how many harms stemming from
incompetent legal practice are not irremediable and stating that "[nievertheless, some potential
harms, notably those involved in criminal defense work, are potentially irremediable and may
justify regulation"); Rhode, supra note 46, at 137 (arguing for the elimination of unauthorized
practice of law prohibitions). However, Rhode also states that "[w]here the risk of injury is
substantial, in contexts such as immigration, consumers may benefit from licensing systems that
impose minimum qualifications and offer proactive enforcement. In other fields it could be
sufficient to register practitioners and permit voluntary certification .... "Id. In evaluating the
risk of harm, it is also useful to remember the relative merits of other regulatory devices, such as
certification, supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text, or malpractice liability, supra note 113
and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (discussing the information asymmetry
inherent in many legal services which makes it difficult for consumers to evaluate the quality of
the service they have received).
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serious, resulting in a large judgment against a blameless client, and "[t]he
intricacies of court procedure and trial tactics, essential to protect clients from
serious harm, suggest the desirability of confining representation to skilled
advocates. ',218  Incompetent representation before a court also has larger
implications for society, such as detrimental effects on efficient court
operation. 219 Furthermore, the information asymmetry found in the court
context may be quite high. It is difficult to evaluate quality when the effects of
incompetent representation are not necessarily apparent.22° Of course, these
harms are largely assumed. The fact that the state does not provide civil
lawyers and allows unsophisticated litigants to appear pro se cuts strongly
against these assumed harms.22' An activity-centered approach should
understand these assumed harms but should base its decision to license an
activity on studies of the actual risk of harm to the consumer and to society at
large. The Task Force's identified factors for determining who should be able
to provide services may also be useful as guideposts in structuring the
evaluation of harm under an activity-centered approach.222
Many efficiencies flow from an activity-centered perspective. A definition
formulated from this perspective has the potential of being drawn very narrowly
and encompassing all the high-risk services, while opening up competition in
the rest of the legal services market.223 An activity-centered definition also
fosters innovation in creating alternative forms of legal service delivery and
providers because the market would be open for many low-risk services. The
process of formulating the definition of the practice of law is also more
efficient under an activity-centered approach. Instead of forcing regulators to
determine abstractly the essence of what a lawyer does and making regulators
weigh the consequences of both activities and individual providers, an
activity-centered approach only requires an evaluation of various
218. Cramton, supra note 29, at 569.
219. See id. at 569-70 (arguing that efficient operation of the court system requires
restricting representation to licensed attorneys who will understand court procedure).
220. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text (discussing information asymmetry in
legal services and stating that even the highest quality defense may result in a loss).
221. Cf. Barton, supra note 57, at 447-48 (discussing how the argument based on serious
harm to the consumer is undermined by the fact that unauthorized practice of law bans do not
stop a person from proceeding pro se).
222. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 5 ("Each jurisdiction should weigh concerns
for public protection and consumer safety, access to justice, preservation of individual choice,
judicial economy, maintenance of professional standards, efficient operation of the marketplace,
costs of regulation and implementation of public policy.").
223. See supra Part II.A. 1.c (discussing the benefits of a narrow definition of the practice
of law).
1957
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1903 (2004)
legal activities. The definition of the practice of law will encompass those
"high-risk" services-those services with sufficiently severe consequences or
those services where the market could not trust clients to adequately waive
potential risks.224
Any definition formulated through an activity-centered perspective also
has the potential to avoid vagueness or arbitrariness concerns. By articulating
exactly what activities nonlawyers cannot perform, the distinction between the
practice of law and all other legal services is drawn clearly. Nonlawyers will
clearly understand what services they can and cannot provide. An activity-
centered definition could take on a laundry list form, listing activities
considered to be the practice of law.225  Unlike a laundry list definition
formulated through a lawyer-centered perspective, however, an activity-
centered definition only lists "high-risk" activities, rather than activities
considered to be what lawyers normally do when they are practicing law.
The activity-centered approach also provides the opportunity for the
formulation of a definition with meaningful distinctions for lawyer and
nonlawyer practice. By evaluating a legal service's actual risk of harm, the
activities that fall within the definition of the practice of law will be those
activities in which it is truly in the public's interest to restrict. The definition
will also avoid arbitrary, primarily linguistic distinctions because the definition
must focus on the underlying transaction of the service rather than on its
224. Note, however, that this perspective does not necessarily advocate a routine or
complex conception of the practice of law. There may be many technically routine legal
services posing a high risk of harm or technically complex legal services posing risk of harm.
The focus is not on the complexity of the service, but on the actual potential for harm-
stemming either from severe damages or a high level of information asymmetry-created by
incompetent service. Under an activity-centered perspective, the practice of law will only
encompass those activities which it truly would be in the public's interest to regulate: Where
regulation must do for the consumer what the consumer cannot do for herself---evaluate quality
and avoid harm. See Rhode, supra note 46, at 83 (discussing the complexity approach taken by
many definitions, criticizing it as often broadly assuming that many activities require the
exclusive use of an attorney, and stating that the approach is both under- and over-inclusive).
225. Several state definitions of the practice of law reflect this laundry list approach, setting
out in detail the types of activities lawyers engage in that are considered to be the practice of
law. For example, the Georgia Code defines the practice of law as:
The practice of law in this state is defined as: (1) Representing litigants in court and
preparing pleadings and other papers incident to any action or special proceedings
in any court or other judicial body; (2) Conveyancing; (3) The preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds whereby a legal right is secured; (4) The rendering of
opinions as to the validity of invalidity of titles to real or personal property; (5) The
giving of any legal advice; and (6) Any action taken for others in any matter
connected with the law.
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-19-50 (2004).
1958
A MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW
appearance by evaluating the actual risk posed. The line will be clearly drawn
and ideally will not reflect a fuzzy legal information or legal advice distinction.
Furthermore, an activity-centered approach provides for meaningful nonlawyer
participation in the marketplace. By allowing nonlawyers to perform "low-risk"
services, services not restricted as the practice of law, nonlawyers will be able
to offer many services to the public. Legal services consumers will utilize these
services if they decide that any risk posed by a nonlawyer provider is personally
acceptable. The activity-centered approach therefore can create a clear,
meaningful, and efficient definition of the practice of law and provide a useful
approach to the formulation of a model definition.
V. Conclusion
Access to legal guidance is a serious problem with which society must
deal, and alternative forms of legal services delivery and providers present a
solution to that problem. The process of restructuring the legal services market
will most likely continue irrespective of whether a model definition of the
practice of law is ever formed. Lawyers, however, should not sit by idly.
Rather, they should ensure that a professional voice is heard in the debate over
the restructuring of the market. The legal community should also consider an
activity-centered perspective in its debate over the definition of the practice of
law, as current forms of evaluating the practice of law are extremely inefficient.
The model definition should understand the benefits and the consequences
that the alternative forms of legal service delivery entail and should truly
protect the public. All lawyers should reassess their notions of the practice of
law and of protection of the public. Whatever the ultimate consensus on the
definition of the practice of law is, the correct balance between the public's
need for access to legal services and its need for protection must be struck.
Access to justice is a problem that should not be ignored. The time has come to
formulate a model definition of the practice of law: If the time is not now, then
when?
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